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ABSTRACT
U.S. Post-Gulf War Policy Toward Iraq:
A Systemic Assessment
by
Amanda Christine Ringeiberg
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis proposes that US policy is structurally flawed toward Iraq and
the Middle East in general. This structural flaw in US policy-making is a result of
ignoring the regional considerations of the Middle East as a subsystem. Current
US strategy toward Iraq is doomed to fail because of the unique structural
considerations in the Middle East and the failure of policy-makers to recognize
them.
The thesis begins with a theoretical examination of the Middle East
subsystem, based on principles from international systems theory. Several
patterns of regularity that define the subsystem are then outlined. An
assessment of US goals and strategies in the region and specifically toward Iraq
will be discussed in terms of the systemic nature of the region. Finally, the case
of US sanctions in Iraq will be used as an example of a failed US policy that was
not in line with the regional considerations of the Middle East.
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INTRODUCTION
US foreign policy toward Iraq has generally not been hailed a success in
the post-Persian Gulf War era. Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, the US
has attempted a number of strategies to achieve its policy goals in Iraq.
Primarily, the US has relied on military and economic sanctions as its primary
weapons against Saddam Hussein. Sanctions have been implemented to
achieve a number of policy goals with regards to Iraq, which will be described
more in depth later in this thesis. Some of these goals included ousting Saddam
Hussein, preventing further Iraqi aggression against its neighbors, and stopping
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Yet eleven years
after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein remains firmly in power, United Nations
(UN) inspectors are forbidden from continuing their inspections of suspected
WMD facilities in Iraq, and international support for economic sanctions is
waning. The US, with some help from the United Kingdom, remains the sole
enforcer of sanctions against Iraq. This decade-old policy has resulted in
significant wear and tear on US military forces and has incurred high diplomatic
costs of maintaining support for an increasingly unpopular policy.
US policy toward Iraq since the Gulf War has failed for a number of
reasons. Part of the blame lies in the fact that sanctions are an imperfect policy
tool. In short, they have not allowed the US to meet its goals toward Iraq
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Sanctioning Iraq has hurt the general Iraqi population, not Saddam Hussein's
government. Saddam has been able to turn sanctions into a rallying cry to stir up
Iraqi citizen hatred against the US. If anything, sanctions have allowed Saddam
to consolidate his grip on power in Iraq. Sanctions may have slowed Iraq’s
development of WMD and stymied Iraq’s military growth, but they have not been
able to eradicate Saddam’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, nor his
ability to use them against his neighbors. All in all, sanctions have had a very
limited effect on Iraq.
Although the key policy tool of the US against Iraq—sanctions—has failed
in the decade since the Gulf War, the blame may not lie in the policy tool itself,
but rather in the manner in which this particular policy was designed. US policy
toward Iraq has been structurally flawed at the domestic, regional, and global
level. Policy toward Iraq has not been examined using the context of the Middle
East as a whole. This has resulted in an inconsistent foreign policy approach
toward different countries in the Middle East. Policies have been created
independent of any other regional concerns. This approach is flawed because
the Middle East should be treated as an interactive system, defined as one in
which actions in one country tend to affect the rest of the countries in that
system. To achieve policy goals in Iraq, the US should look at the Middle East
as an interactive, regional subsystem, with a set of unique regional
considerations (described in Chapter 2). These regional considerations will
affect all policy implementation in the region. Implementing policy strategies in
Iraq independent of these regional considerations is unproductive and leads to a
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systematic failure of foreign policy. Therefore, even if sanctions were
theoretically a perfect strategy to achieve US foreign policy goals in Iraq, they are
doomed to fail because the policy was created without accounting for the Middle
East as a system.
To show how this structural flaw in US policy-making toward Iraq has led
to a failure in post-Gulf War policy, this thesis will be presented in five parts.
Chapter 1 will examine the theoretical basis of systems theory and focus on
regional subsystems and their characteristics. Chapter 2 will review the regional
considerations that are unique to the Middle East as a regional subsystem.
Chapter 3 will assess US policy in the Middle East in terms of US goals in the
region and their incompatibility with the regional considerations discussed in
Chapter 2. Chapter 4 will examine the US strategies implemented to meet US
policy goals in the Middle East, again examined in terms of the regional
considerations unique to the Middle East. Chapter 5 will conclude by bringing
the issues together, showing how specific US policy goals and strategy—using
the case study of sanctions in Iraq—have failed due to the impact the Middle
East subsystem has on US foreign policy in the region.
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CHAPTER 1
THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
International Systems Theory
To adequately discuss the Middle East as a regional subsystem, a
foundation must be laid in general international systems theory. The term
“system” describes how units interact with each other. The classic dictionary
definition of a system is: a set or arrangement of things so related or connected
as to form a unity or organic whole.^ In the field of international relations, a
system construct can be used to examine how foreign policies are formulated
and how states or other units interact or relate to each other.^ In this paper,
treating the Middle East as a system allows one to show how the structural
aspects of the regional subsystem affect US foreign policy decisions, even
though US policy-makers have largely ignored the regional aspects of their
decisions. According to structural/systems theory, the actions of individual states
when aggregated produce patterns of behavior that may be fundamentally
different from the behavior patterns that would exist if the individual actor was
part of other structures.^ Therefore, if Iraq was part of a presumed subsystem in
the Middle East, there would be patterns of behavior that apply to Iraq because
of its location within that particular subsystem.
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One of the most important aspects of systems theory in terms of
examining US foreign policy in the Middle East is the framework the theory
provides. Discussing the Middle East as a set of regional considerations (or
patterns of behavior) provides a framework for analyzing US foreign policy
decisions. Iraq, being a part of the Middle East subsystem, will behave typically
in certain ways, and this behavior has a profound effect on the foreign policy
decisions made by the US and especially on the policy's outcomes. Therefore
once the patterns are identified, it becomes easier to analyze not only past policy
decisions, but also to plan the effects of future policy decisions with more
accuracy to some degree. Work to identify these regional patterns has occurred
at both the international and regional level.
At the international level, Morton Kaplan defined a system as a set of
variables (or actors) so unique that regular patterns of behavior can be noted
both internally (among the variables) and externally (groups of variables
interacting with other groups).'* Kaplan focused his study of the international
system on defining a set of “rules” that could be used to describe different
systems. Kaplan came up with six different models of international systems and
each model had its own set of “rules.” The following is an example of each of his
model’s rules of behavior (in the interest of brevity, not all rules are included in
this summary).
Balance of Power model:
1) States act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight.
2) States fight rather than pass up opportunity to increase capabilities.
3) States stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor.
4) States act to oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume
a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system.^
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Example: This model existed in the nineteenth century to pre-World War I
with England, France, Germany, the Austro-Hungarian empire and the
United States as key national actors.^
Loose Bipolar Model:
1) Blocs (of which there are two) strive to increase their relative
capabilities.
2) Blocs tend to be willing to run at least some risks to eliminate rival
blocs.
3) Blocs tend to engage in major war rather than to permit rival blocs to
attain predominance.
4) Non-bloc actors tend to act to reduce the danger or war between blocs.
5) Universal actors (such as the United Nations) are to reduce the
incompatibility between the blocs.^
Example: This would describe a system with two blocs (such as the Soviet
bloc and US bloc during the Cold War), but where other non-bloc
countries and organizations such as the United Nations still exert influence
on the two blocs.
Tight Bipolar model:
(Same rules as the loose bipolar model, with rules pertaining to non-bloc
actors and universal actors deleted)
1) Blocs (of which there are two) strive to increase their relative
capabilities.
2) Blocs tend to be willing to run at least some risks to eliminate rival
blocs.
3) Blocs tend to engage in major war rather than to permit rival blocs to
attain predominance.
Example: This may have described the Cold War or parts of the Cold War
period, if one believes that organizations such as the United Nations were
powerless and that all national actors were firmly entrenched in one bloc
or the other.
Universal International System model:
1) All national actors will attempt to increase their rewards and access to
facilities.
2) All national actors will attempt to increase the resources and productive
base of the international system.
3) All actors will tend to use peaceful methods to obtain their objectives
and not resort to force.®
Example: There is no historical example, but this system could develop
out of a loose bipolar system with a universal actor that assumes more
functions within the system.’®
Hierarchical International Svstem model:
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This model assumes an integration of functions between national actors,
thus the main rules are that the system will legitimize the structure and
functions of the hierarchical system. The system will link rewards and
access to facilities according to the criteria of the system.” This system
could be imposed by force upon a bipolar or universal system, leading to a
directive (authoritarian) hierarchical system. Or this system may evolve
from a universal system, in which case the system will more likely by nondirective.’^
Unit Veto International Svstem model:
Some basic rules of this system are that all national or bloc actors will
possess the capability to destroy each other; no universal actors will exist;
and the system will be stable only if all actors are prepared to resist
threats and to retaliate in case of attack.’®This model corresponds to the
Hobbesian state of nature, in which all interests are opposed, but each
actor obeys the golden rule-he will not do to others what he would not
have them do to him.’*
Kaplan’s international models and rules of conduct can prove to be useful
in describing, theorizing about, or even predicting a state or group of states’
behavior. As one moves from looking at the international system as a whole
(and trying to discern patterns of behavior), and examines regional behavior
patterns, it becomes apparent that Kaplan’s framework can be useful at other
levels of analysis besides the international level. If regional subsystems such as
the Middle East have some of the same characteristics as international systems
(i.e., they are composed of states that together form a larger whole), then one
should be able to come up with patterns of behavior or informal rules of conduct
for the Middle East. Out of Kaplan’s six models, the balance of power model
would generally be the most applicable to the Middle East. The other five models
deal with blocs, a hierarchical system, or a situation in which all states have the
power to destroy each other. While all of these elements are present to some
degree in the Middle East, the balance of power model is the best fit for this
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region. More importantly, one must Identify the specific “rules” that govern the
Middle East rather than try to apply Kaplan’s international models to a regional
subsystem. These specific regional patterns will be examined in Chapter 2.

Regional Subsystem Theory
A regional subsystem, as the words imply, can be defined as a system of
states that is less significant in scale than the global systems such as those
defined by Kaplan. These regional subsystems by definition will also have less
“power” than the international systems such as the US-USSR bipolar system
during the Cold War. Following criteria developed by Michael Brecher for
identifying boundaries between regional clusters of states, Michael Haas
identified subsystems in terms of three elements:
1) Scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region.
2) There are at least two actors.
3) There is a relatively self-contained network of political interactions
between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment,
adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power
relations and military interactions.’®
The word integration conjures up an entire body of literature based on integration
theories regarding regional subsystems. This thesis does not assert that the
Middle East is an integrative system, but rather proposes that looking at the
Middle East as a subsystem provides a useful tool for policy analysis.
Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel felt the study of regional international
politics was important for empirical, theoretical, and most significant for this
thesis, for policy reasons. They recognized the study of regional politics as being
important for “accurately understanding the dynamics of the region as part of the
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objective of stabilizing the international system.”’®A policy aimed at stability,
such as US policy in the Middle East, must begin with local issues and local
balances of power. “A regional focus encourages the surgical use of the scalpel
rather than the destructive wielding of the meat cleaver in foreign policy.”’^
Cantori and Speigel defined a regional subsystem as “one state, or of two
or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic,
linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is
sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the
system.”’ ®Cantori and Speigel defined the nature of a subordinate system (or a
subsystem, as it will be called in this paper) based on its cohesion,
communications, level of power, and the structure of relations.’®A subsystem
could be further delineated into three subdivisions: the core sector, the peripheral
sector, and the intrusive sector. In the Middle East, Cantori and Speigel defined
the core sector as comprised of Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq,
Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, and the smaller Gulf states, the peripheral sector
contained Israel, Iran, Turkey (and Afghanistan), and the intrusive sector was
made up of the US, Russia, Western Europe and China.^
Based on their research, Cantori and Speigel found the Middle East to be
a “coherent” subsystem, in which relatively low levels of cohesion,
communications, power, and cooperation were identified as compared to other
subsystems.^’ Other coherent subsystems were South Asia, East Asia, West
Africa and Central Africa. The next level of subsystem was classified as
“cohesive,” and this group included Latin America, North Africa and Southern
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Africa. They classified the Middle Eastern core (excluding Israel, Turkey and
Iran) as a “cohesive” system, defined as having a high element of one of the
pattern variables, usually cohesion, but where conflict is still possible. The next
level up was “consolidative” and this group included Western Europe, Southwest
Pacific, and Eastern Europe. Finally, the highest level of subsystems was the
“integrative” subsystems of North America and the Soviet Union.^
They found the level of social cohesion in the Middle East to be very high,
organizational cohesion, moderate, and economic and political cohesion, low
overall. Communications (via the mass media and among the elite) were only
moderate, but power was small and the level of conflict was very great. The core
did not have the cooperative elements such as those found in the Latin American
core, for example.^ Bringing the Middle East peripheral states into the equation
blurred the cohesiveness of the Middle Eastern core even further. Conflict
between the core and periphery then became the main reason the Middle East
ranked the lowest on Cantori and Speigel's four levels of subsystem integration.^*
For this thesis, it will be imperative to treat the Middle East core and
peripheral sectors as one system when examining the characteristics of the
region. An analysis of US foreign policy toward Iraq requires the examination of
the outcomes of US policies as they are applied to Iraq and as they are
perceived by the entire Middle East subsystem. This subsystem is heavily
influenced by the ongoing conflict between the core and peripheral sectors, thus
making it important to analyze both sectors of the Middle East subsystem when
conducting policy analysis. The Middle East subsystem will be defined for this
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paper as including Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Israel,
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and
Qatar.
While Cantori and Speigel emphasized the level of cohesion between
various world subsystems, and the relation of their core, periphery and intrusive
sectors, other work in this field has concentrated more on identifying patterns of
regularity among the states of a subsystem. William R. Thompson defined a
regional subsystem in terms of these patterns of interaction. His definition was:
“necessary and sufficient conditions for a regional subsystem include: regularity
and intensity of interactions so that a change in one part affects other parts;
general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition of the subsystem as
distinctive; and provision of at least two, and probably more, actors in the
subsystem.”^®
Thompson conducted an empirical study of the Middle East as a
subsystem from 1946-1975 and found evidence of an increasingly larger network
of Arab states that managed to sustain interaction throughout the period of study.
He found that communication and interaction among the Arab states were
greater than the amount of their interaction with non-Arab states. Therefore,
although the structure of Middle East subsystem was found to be fluid, it was
consistently Arab in its character.*
The Middle East has thus been established as a regional subsystem that
is made up of Arab (and non-Arab) states that consistently interact with one
another and where the actions of one state have a good chance of affecting
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another state or states. This cohesiveness will be important in examining US
policy toward Iraq because of the tendency for US and/or Iraqi actions to have an
effect on other states because of the Middle East’s inherent nature as a
subsystem. Therefore, US policy must be evaluated not only based on its effect
on Iraq, but also based on its effect on the Middle East as a whole, and that
reciprocal effect on future US policy in the region. Policy designed with regard to
the Middle East as a subsystem may have a greater chance of success than
policy designed without factoring in the regional considerations of the Middle
East.
In addition to examining the cohesiveness of the Middle East subsystem, it
is also important to conduct a thorough review of the specific attributes of the
subsystem before evaluating US policy toward a member of the subsystem. As
mentioned previously, Cantori and Speigel found the Middle East to have
relatively low levels of cohesion as compared to other subsystems, and
specifically the Middle East had less political and organizational cohesion than it
did social and economic.Thompson found the Middle East to be a fluid system,
consistently Arab in its character, with greater internal communication than
external communication.
Leonard Binder came up with a set of variables that defined the Middle
East. He noted first of all the importance of common membership in the Ottoman
Empire for countries in the Middle East because the Ottomans left similar
institutions and social networks. He also pointed out the importance of Islamic
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culture, pan-Arabism, common language, and ease of communication as being
important to the identification of the Middle East subsystem.*
Similar to Binder, Tareq Y. Ismael studied the Middle East as a regional
subsystem to identify “consistent patterns of interaction that give a characteristic
structure to the internal and external relations of the area.’’* Ismael placed more
emphasis on domestic and regional factors than on international influence as a
determinant of Middle East nation’s behaviors. As with Kaplan’s models of
international behavior, Ismael outlined several “rules" that apply to the Middle
East. He listed three critical realities of the Middle East subsystem;
1) Domestic politics define the discourse of contemporary Middle Eastern
foreign policies.
Culture, ideology, politics and economics all play a crucial role in defining
foreign policy goals and state behavior in the Middle East. More importantly,
domestic patterns of variation can be discerned such as a tendency for countries
to integrate, sharing a common language, the pervasive Arab-lslamic culture,
and a history of Western rule. These patterns all serve to shape the foreign
policy goals among the Middle Eastern nations.®®
2) Processes and structural arrangements offerees at the regional level
are extremely important.
When the nations of the Middle East are focused on an issue, such as the
Palestinian struggle in the 1970s, the subsystem is able to generate a
considerable amount of power on the international scene. Ismael pointed to the
ability of the Arab states to cooperate on oil issues in the 1970s and how they
subsequently were able to exert considerable influence on the global system.®’
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Conversely, when the system Is unfocused (or states are strongly focused on
individual issues), the power of the regional subsystem declines, and the system
becomes fragmented.®^
3) The Middle East occupies an intermediate position in the global system,
and as such both receives and exerts influence.®®
The Middle East is a region of strategic importance to most of the major
nations in the global system. Western Europe, the US, Russia, and China all
have considerable systemic influence on the Middle East, yet the region is also
able to generate its own influence on the international players.®* For example,
while the US maintains a significant military, economic, and political presence
throughout much of the Middle East, the Arab-lsraeli conflict continues to affect
domestic political concerns in the US.

Policy Analysis in the Middle East
To adequately analyze US policies in the Middle East, and specifically
toward Iraq, some domestic and global constraints on US policy-makers must be
addressed in addition to the regional considerations of the Middle East
highlighted in Chapter 2. Some of the domestic considerations facing US policy
makers are the strong Jewish lobby fighting for the security of Israel at all costs,
and the politics surrounding oil issues where everyone from environmentalists to
multi-national corporations has an opinion. On the global scene, the US must
temper its policy-making based on international support, especially the influence
of Western Europe and Russia on relations in the Middle East. US policy in the
Middle East is affected by domestic, regional and global concerns. The domestic
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and global constraints on US policy-makers will be touched upon in Chapter 3
during the discussion of US goals in the region. However, the primary focus of
this thesis is on the regional considerations of the Middle East and how they
affect US policy-making.
A lot of work has previously been accomplished in the field of international
relations that describe the Middle East as a regional subsystem, with its own set
of unique characteristics and informal rules of conduct. There has not been a lot
of work using a systems theory framework to analyze foreign policy
effectiveness. However, use of the subsystem theoretical construct has been
useful in describing relations internally among the Middle Eastern countries, and
showing linkages of the Middle Eastern region to the global system. The system
construct can also been useful when describing the behavior of a specific state
within the Middle East subsystem and possibly predicting the future behavior of
that state. One intention of this thesis is to show that the subsystem construct
can also be a useful framework in analyzing the success of foreign policy goals
and strategy as they are interpreted within the subsystem. This thesis plans to
use the regional subsystem as a theoretical framework for describing and
analyzing US foreign policy toward Iraq since the Persian Gulf War.
A general characteristic of a regional subsystem (as stated earlier by
Thompson) is that the actions of one country will affect other countries in that
system. Also, a subsystem is defined by a set of informal rules or patterns of
behavior that should be expected to remain relatively consistent across the
subsystem. This being the case, US foreign policy decisions made toward one
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Middle Eastern country should 1) be expected to affect more than just the target
country, and 2) be hindered or enhanced by the patterns of behavior found in the
Middle East. Analysis of a particular policy can then be conducted and that
policy can be shown to be either compatible or incompatible with the systemic
nature of the Middle East (i.e. compatible/incompatible with the broader regional
considerations of the policy). However, one key limitation to the use of systems
theory in this manner is that It assumes that countries in a subsystem are
homogenous and will behave in the same way. There are great differences
between many nations in the Middle East, especially politically and economically.
The Middle East subsystem can be a very fragmented one, and thus does not
conform nicely to the general regional considerations that will be described in
Chapter 2. Despite this shortcoming, looking at the Middle East in a systemic
manner does have some positive applications, especially in the realm of US
foreign policy-making.
This thesis strives to examine US foreign policy toward Iraq in terms of the
regional considerations of the Middle East from the perspective of the US policy
maker. Using a theoretical framework of six particular regional considerations of
the Middle East subsystem (explained in Chapter 2), US policy goals and
strategies in the Middle East will be assessed in terms of these regional
considerations (Chapters 3 and 4). Finally, the structural problems of US policy
toward Iraq will be explained using the sanctions policy tool as an example
(Chapter 5).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

Chapter Notes
^Webster’s New World Dictionary, 3^^ College Edition (New York: Simon &
Schuster, Inc, 1988), 1359.
^Raymond Tanter, “International Systems and Foreign Policy Approaches:
Implications for Conflict Modeling and Management,” in Theory and Poiicyin
International Relations, eds. Raymond Tanter and Richard A. Ullman (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 8.
^Richard Little, “Structuralism and Neo-Realism,” in international
Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, eds. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom
(London: HarperCollins Academics, 1991), 76.
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New
York: Wiley, 1957), 4.
^Morton A. Kaplan, ed.. Great Issues of International Politics (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), 9.
®Kaplan, 1957, 22.
^Kaplan, 1970, 11.
^Kaplan, 1957, 44.
% id., 47.
^°lbid., 45.
"Ibid., 49.
^%id., 48.
^%id., 51.
^^Ibid., 50.
^®Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” The
American Political Science Review, vol. 64 (1970), 101.
^®Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Speigel, “The Analysis of Regional
International Politics: The Integration Versus the Empirical Systems Approach,”
International Organization (1973), 465.
^^Ibid., 467.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

’®Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Speigel, The International Politics of
Regions: A Comparative Approach (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 6-7.
’®lbid.. 7.
^Ibid., 8.
2^lbid., 382
^Ibid.
^Ibid., 386
2^lbid., 387
^ ^illia m R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual
Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly, 17(1)
(March 1973), 101.
W illia m R. Thompson, “Delineating Regional Subsystem: Visit Networks
and the Middle East Case," International Joumal of Middle East Studies, 13(2)
(May 1981), 219.
^^Tareq Y. Ismael, International Relations and the Contemporary Middle
East: A Study in World Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 8.
^°Leonard Binder, “The Middle East as a Subordinate International
System,” World Politics 10(3) (April 1958), 408-429.
^Ismael, 6.
“ Ismael, 18.
Ismael, 13.
“ Ismael, 42.
“ Ismael, 12-13.
^Ismael, 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 2

REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
Introduction
A regional subsystem such as the Middle East will have general
characteristics and a set of informal rules or patterns of behavior that define it as
a subsystem. The Middle East shares some general characteristics with other
regional subsystems in the world, such as being a group of interacting states with
ethnic, cultural, social, historical and linguistic bonds/ What happens in one part
of the subsystem will affect other parts of the subsystem due to the interaction
between nations of a subsystem.^ But beyond the general characteristics of a
regional subsystem, the Middle East subsystem has some specific patterns of
behavior that are unique to it. This Chapter will explore the historical basis for
these patterns, which will be used to analyze US policy in the Middle East in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Just as Morton Kaplan came up with a set of rules to govern his
international models, the Middle East subsystem is based on a set of regional
considerations. These considerations are useful to understand from a policy
making standpoint, since they will affect the outcomes of policies enacted in the
region. This set of regional considerations will also help shape US policy
positions in the region. When the US creates a policy to reach a certain goal
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with Iraq, these regional considerations will affect the nature of Iraq’s response to
the policy as well as the regional responses.
Six regional considerations will be considered in this chapter. First, the
Middle East nations are traditionally non-democratic in nature, leading to very
limited foreign policy inputs from the population in the decision-making process.
Second, pan-Arab and pan-lslamic themes are prevalent in many of the policies
and decisions made by leaders in the Middle East. Third, there is a culture of
anti-imperialism and anti-Westemism among the population in the Middle East.
Fourth, the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio has polarized the region, along with the larger
global system, and has forced nations to take sides in this highly volatile conflict.
Fifth, the Middle East has been economically under-developed compared to the
West, largely because the government elites are unwilling to change the
economic structure and due to the Gulf nations’ reliance on oil exports. Sixth, the
Middle East subsystem is largely a fragmented system, which weakens the
subsystem as a whole.
No single list of considerations for the Middle East could ever cover all the
possible patterns of behavior for the region. However, the six considerations
listed above are designed to cover the substantive areas of economics, culture,
religion, politics, and social issues that bond nations of a region together into a
subsystem. They also cover the most salient issues that characterize the Middle
East and are the most pervasive issues in the region. The six considerations
offered in this thesis build on the patterns in the Middle East previously noted by
Thompson, Binder and Ismael (discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis).^
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Non-Democratic Governments
The typical Middle Eastern government is non-democratic, which is to say
that the governments are not elected by the people, and not held accountable for
their actions to the people in the form of regular, open elections. Of the 16
countries considered in this thesis, seven are monarchies (Bahrain, Jordan,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia), three are essentially
autocratic (Iraq, Syria, and Libya), three are republics (Egypt, Yemen, and
Lebanon), two are parliamentary democracies (Turkey and Israel), and Iran is an
Islamic republic with elected officials.^ While there is variance among the degree
of popular input allowed by each of these forms of government, the monarchies
and autocracies have the least amount of orderly input by their populations into
the process of government. With the exception of Turkey and Israel, one could
argue that as many as 14 nations in this region exclude large portions of their
populations from policy-making. However, there is also a certain degree of
disorderly participation that happens throughout the Middle East in the form of
riots and protests. This increased mobilization of the population has been on the
rise in recent years. As a result of modernization, the lower strata of the
population has rising expectations and the newer middle classes are demanding
greater participation in government.^ In general though, this demand for change
has not caused a significant increase in the amount of participation allowed by
governments, especially when it involves foreign policy decisions.
This lack of orderly political input from the general population in the Middle
East means that heads of state have a lot of power to make unilateral decisions
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on behalf of their country. Ultimately, the leader of a country becomes the sole
foreign policy-making body of that country. Traditionally, foreign policy
establishments are generally weak and there is virtually no input from the non
elite segments of the typical Middle Eastern population.^ In some states such as
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the religious clerics attempt to assert considerable
impact on the government and influence its foreign policies. The Islamic leaders
espouse policies that are more often anti-West and against the rapid pace of
modernization than the secular leaders.^ This is not to imply that there are no
other inputs from within or outside the government in making foreign policy
decisions, just that the Middle Eastern leaders typically have far more latitude in
decision-making than those in the Western-style democracies.® It is also
important to note that the type of decision being made affects the source of the
policy-making. In matters of “high” politics such as national security, the Middle
Eastern leader has more power to make decisions unilaterally than in domestic
concerns. This is even true in Israel, a democracy, where the prime minister is
granted more freedom to act independently when military action is called for.®
Another example of a leader not consulting the population or even his own
government with matters of foreign policy was Anwar Sadat’s decision to make
peace with Israel in 1978. Many of his top officials reported that Sadat
circumvented the foreign policy process and acted independently to reach a
peace agreement with Israel at Camp David.“ Sadat reportedly “surprised ” his
security council and foreign minister with a verbal notice of his intentions just 24
hours prior to his departure to Camp David."
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The perils of massing so much decision-making power in one person, or a
small elite group of people, are many. Foreign policy decisions are subject to the
whims and fancy of the leader in power, and once that leadership has changed
(whether through peaceful transition or not), the nation could take a completely
different course. This is not only unsettling for the nation’s citizens, but also for
the outside countries trying to carve out diplomatic agreements with the nation in
flux. Another peril is that foreign policy decisions are sometimes made to
legitimize governments or leaders in the Middle East, without any sound basis to
the decisions.^ For example, Saddam Hussein made an almost unilateral
decision to engage his country in a war with Iran based on reasons that many
would say were personally motivated and unsound.
The Ba th Party in Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein form a compelling
example of a Middle Eastern nation where the government acts independently of
its people and where foreign policy decisions are essentially at the discretion of
the head of state. The Iraqi nation is a plural one, made up of five nationalities,
six religions and four languages. “ As a result, successful leaders have had to
dominate the diverse groups through centralized control of the government. The
Ba’th Party established firm control over the nation in 1968 (after a failed attempt
to do so in 1963), and set up a party apparatus with a cellular composition,
designed to promote loyalty and limit participation at the highest levels of the
government. Once Saddam Hussein assumed full control of the party in 1979,
he surrounded himself with a “clique” of loyal followers, mostly men from his
hometown of Tikrit.’^
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In 1980 when Iraq (i.e. Saddam) decided to attack Iran, the decision was
not made in response to actual provocations on the Iranian side. Although a
complicated issue, part of the reason Saddam decided to go to war with Iran was
that he felt his regime was being threatened by the rise of the radical Ayatollah
Khomeini.^® Saddam saw an opportunity to safeguard his regime and settle some
long-standing disputes in the Shatt al-Arab waterway through a war with Iran.
After the Iran-lraq war, Saddam thought he was invincible as an Arab leader and
again took a foreign policy gamble by invading Kuwait in 1990.^® Once again, the
decision made by Saddam was unilateral, with little to no input from even his elite
top advisers.
The Iraqi case is a good example of the non-democratic nature of the
Middle East, especially with regards to foreign policy-making. This regional
consideration is important to keep in mind when examining the effects of US
foreign policy in the region. Understanding the political leadership of the country
in question is crucial in the Middle East because that leader is probably the sole
proprietor of any future policy reactions from that nation.

Pan-Arabism and Pan-lslamic Ideals
The second regional consideration is the notion of a pan-Arab and/or a
pan-lslamic ideal that is aspired to by many government leaders, religious clerics,
and intellectuals in the Middle East. The notion that “we are all Arabs” or "we are
all Muslims” began to take hold in earnest as the decline in Western colonialism
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was occurring. In fact, the rise in Arab nationalism was an important factor in the
decline of Western influence in the Middle East following World War 11.^^
The idea that cooperation between Arab states was necessary for
progress became an increasingly popular objective of foreign policy in the Middle
East after World War II, especially after the creation of the common Arab enemy-Israel. Pan-Arabists strove to unify the Arab nations of the Middle East and
achieve strength through common foreign policy decisions. Two founding
movements took hold during the 1950s with President Nasser of Egypt’s call for
Arab unity and the Ba’th movement in Iraq and Syria. Nasser called for military
prowess and physical struggle to achieve the goals of a modern Arab world, and
he believed the Arabs needed a strong leader to rally behind.’®After his death in
1970, an Arab leader with Nasser’s charisma and vision was not to be found, and
the call for Arab unity shifted to an emphasis on nationalism. However, one
lingering pan-Arab institution was the Arab League, which continues to promote
cooperation among the Arab nations and stands in opposition to the state of
Israel.’®
Iraq and the Ba’th Party also stand out as prominent examples of the push
to achieve pan-Arab ideals. The Ba’thist ideology has influenced groups from
Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as smaller groups from Sudan,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Libya.“ The pan-Arab movement such as
the doctrine subscribed to by the Ba’th Party was able to bring non-Muslims into
the call for unity, and in the case of Iraq, even the definition of an “Arab” was
loosened up to be able to include more nationalities into the movement.^’ Ba’thist
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ideology centered around Arab unity, with the theoretical goal of breaking down
national borders among Arab states and creating one unified Arab nation. In
practice however, the larger pan-Arab goal quickly broke down after a split in the
Ba’th Party between Syrian and Iraqi officials. Now both claim to be the true
heirs to the Ba’thist ideology.
In Iraq the Ba’th Party now has three socio-political and economic goals:
Arab unity (tempered by the reality that national borders are here to stay),
freedom from external dominance, and socialism (economic development of
public projects).^ There was also a cultural campaign in the 1970s to
reinvigorate Arab nationalism based on history—going all the way back to preIslamic Mesopotamia to stir up patriotic feelings about the country’s roots.“
Saddam Hussein sees himself today as the torchbearer for Arab nationalism,
both as the leader of Iraq’s Ba’th Party and as a self-appointed successor to
Egypt’s President Nasser, who had called for Arab unity in the 1950s and 60s.^^
Hussein even tried to politically “spin” the invasion of Kuwait as being motivated
by a pan-Arab goal of liberating Jerusalem from the Jewish population in Israel.
Saddam then used a withdrawal from Kuwait as leverage to bargain
(unsuccessfully) for the withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem.^® During the Persian
Gulf War he also tried to drum up Arab support for his cause by showcasing
Western “atrocities” on worldwide TV broadcasts and portraying his struggle as
the West vs. the Arab world.“
After World War II, there was also a concurrent rise in pan-lslamic
movements. This movement was led early on from outside the Middle East by
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Pakistan which sponsored a number of conferences to promote cooperation
between the Muslim s t a t e s . A number of Islamic organizations were also
founded, the most influential of these being the Islamic Conference Organization
which was started in 1969.“ The concept of Islamic unity or an Islamic nation
has had major political impact in the Middle East. Prime examples of this have
been the Islamic revolution in Iran and the role of the Wahhabis in Saudi
Arabia.^ Unlike the call for Arab unity, which has waned in the latter part of the
20*^ century, pan-lslamism and Islamic fundamentalism have been on the rise.
Much of this resurgence has been due to the lower and middle classes
(especially the disenfranchised youth) in the Middle East who are increasingly
disaffected and have embraced Islam as the religion of the oppressed.®®
The pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements have become part of the
cultural fabric of the Middle East, especially in the last 50 years or so. These
movements transcend national boundaries and provide a common bond for
people to relate as “Arabs” or “Muslims.” As a result of this cultural phenomenon,
outside nations have had a difficult time penetrating the region with any broad
success. This is especially true for Western nations that are home to small Arab
populations and espouse primarily Judeo-Christian values. The pan-Arab and
pan-lslamic culture of the Middle East presents a formidable challenge to the US,
largely because it drives Middle Eastern countries to make foreign policy
decisions that may not fall in line with US policy goals. Therefore it is reasonable
to assume that if the US pursues a policy that is difficult for Middle Eastern
leaders to accept, they may pursue pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals and hence.
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the US policy is more likely to fail. The persistence of pan-Arab or pan-lslamic
movements in the Middle East means that this will remain an important regional
consideration for US policy-making for some time to come.

Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Westemism
Closely linked with the pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements is the
presence of anti-imperialist/anti-Westem attitudes found in the Middle East.
These attitudes are a direct result of a shared history of Western colonialism and
interference in this region. The nationalist struggles to gain independence from
the Western powers in the first part of the 20“’ century were precursors to the
pan-Arab and pan-lslamic movements that surfaced toward the end of the
century. The strong desire to be free from Western influence is an important
consideration in the Middle East, and one that creates unique policy concerns for
the US in particular.
The prevalence of anti-imperialist and anti-Western attitudes in the Middle
East has its origins in the demise of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1800s, the
Ottoman Empire began to lose economic and political ground to its European
rivals.®’ As the Ottoman Empire was steadily weakened, the door opened for
Europeans in pursuit of raw materials and open markets in the Middle East. By
the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become essentially a semi
colony of Europe, providing an agrarian reserve for the expanding capitalist
economies.®^ Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I,
Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the US colonized the Middle East for
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several decades. A central component of the rivalry among the Western nations
was control of the vast oil reserves in the region.
After World War II, oil remained the primary natural resource of interest
among the Western powers, but the US emerged from the conflict with newfound
power and influence in the region. The US now dominated the economies of its
capitalist rivals as well as those of the Middle East nations.®® Ex-British mandates
from Palestine to Iran fell under the US sphere of influence and a series of proUS neocolonial states were set up throughout the Middle East. Rivalries in the
region between the US and the USSR during the Cold War forced the US to
pursue the establishment of a series of pro-US governments. The US strove to
maintain dominance in the region by committing large transfers of weapons to
the nations under its influence.®^
This history of imperialism and dominance by the Western powers (and to
a lesser extent Soviet imperialism) has affected and continues to affect foreign
policy in the Middle East. Obviously, there is an element of mistrust in relations
between the West and the Middle East stemming from decades of economic and
political exploitation. Also, anti-imperialism has led to policies of “positive
neutralism” by many nations in the Middle East. Positive neutralism is a policy of
non-alignment with the major powers and a commitment to aid the less
developed countries in the Middle East.®® This policy of non-alignment was
started by President Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s, and was continued by nations
such as Iraq, South Yemen, Syria, Algeria and Sudan in the 1960s.®® The Ba’th
Party in Iraq still officially subscribes today to positive neutralism in its foreign
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policy, with an obvious anti-Western flavor. The second of the Ba’th Party’s three
social goals, freedom, (unity and socialism are the other two) has been
interpreted to mean that Iraqi citizens should be free from external dominance
and reduce dependence on other states.®^ Positive neutralism can have a
significant impact on Western nations trying to influence foreign policy outcomes
in the Middle East. However, since the Persian Gulf War, the doctrine of positive
neutralism has been on the decline in the region. Nations have been more
concerned with improving their own economic situation, and less interested in
achieving pan-Arab goals.
Another factor leading to the anti-imperialist/anti-Western attitudes that are
prevalent in the Middle East has been the perceived inconsistency and self
interestedness of foreign policy decisions by the Western powers, especially the
US. One example of this inconsistency was during the Iran-lraq War. The US
had previously not supported the Ba’th regime in Iraq, but when Iraq began
fighting the Revolutionary government in Iran, the US decided to provide
intelligence information to Iraq in order to prevent Iran from achieving a victory
over Iraq.®®
An example of self-interested (and unpopular) policy-making by the US
occurred in Iran. In 1953 the US supported a coup to overthrow the National
Front Party leader Mossadeq because he wanted to reduce foreign influence in
Iran and nationalize the oil fields.®® The US supported this coup despite the fact
that Mossadeq was anti-Communist. In 1979, in the middle of the Cold War, the
US then opposed the Iranian Revolution (although the revolutionaries were anti-
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Marxist and anti-Soviet) based largely on the fact that the US would lose control
of the Shah’s pro-US regime and Iran’s oil.“ In both cases the US acted in its
own best economic and political interest, yet attempted to couch its decision in
terms of what was best for the Iranian people. Many in the Middle East could
readily see the contradiction of supporting a brutally repressive regime under the
Shah for purely self-interested motives such as access to oil in Iran.
Inconsistent policies have caused many in the Middle East to believe the
US makes foreign policy decisions based on purely selfish economic or political
reasons, at the expense of what may be the best decision for Middle Eastern
nations. This deepens the mistrust of Western powers and especially the US,
making it very difficult for the US to influence events in the region, especially at
the popular level. This legacy of anti-Western attitudes in the Middle East
significantly impacts policy-making in the region. Understanding this
consideration about the Middle East, and attempting to minimize the concerns it
brings up, will help to ensure the US makes successful policy decisions toward
the Middle East.

Economic Structure
Another regional consideration that influences policy outcomes in the
Middle East is the relationship between the Arab elite and the West, and the
economic structure brought about by this relationship. Just as the prevalent anti
imperialist/anti-Western attitude took its roots from the colonial past of the Middle
East, the contemporary economic patterns in the Middle East also have ties to
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the colonization of the region by the Western powers. There are prevailing
economic patterns that still define the region today. One pattern is that small
groups of Arab elite almost single-handedly control the national economies.
Another characteristic is the region is significantly less developed as compared to
the West. Also, there is a division of “have” and “have-not” countries within the
Middle East, broken out along oil producing and non-oil producing lines. All of
these patterns have substantial impact on foreign policy in the region. US policy
makers need to understand these patterns in order to better predict the outcome
of their policy decisions in the Middle East.
The colonization of the Middle East by the Western powers set up a
“transnational system of privilege” in which the privileged few joined forces
across national borders and set up a system defined by inequity, dependence,
and exploitation.'" The dominant (in this case Western) countries controlled the
subordinate countries by establishing a cozy relationship with the domestic elites.
The domestic elites remain detached from the broader population in their
country, and they continue to strive to maintain this arrangement because it
personally benefits their own group of elite citizens."*® In the Middle East, this
ruling elite was initially made up of sherifs (those who claim to be descendants of
Muhammad), traditional tribal sheikhs, religious leaders and the subsidiary
groups of merchants after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Although many would
later quarrel with the Western powers, in the beginning all were willing servants
of the British and the French, at the expense of the ruled classes.*®
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The West continues to support these elite ruling cliques even today
because of the great economic benefit derived from the arrangement such as
access to oil and military arms sales. The West overlooks the legitimacy of these
ruling groups and continues to support them as long as the ruling elite is proWest.** The US will work with the legitimate, modernizing elite—the Arab leaders
who buck the traditional, religious political structure—if those leaders are pro-US.
If not, the US will establish a relationship with the illegitimate governments
anyway. This relationship between the West and the Arab elite has kept the
West in control of relatively cheap oil prices and has maintained the ability to act
almost unilaterally in this region since the 1970s. This feeds into Johan
Galtung’s theory of imperialism and the relationship of the core and the periphery
states. Galtung believed the privileged few would join forces across borders,
thus leading to a structure that allowed economic, political and social imperialism
to exist.*® The West and its relationship with the Arab elite may be to blame for
the continued underdevelopment of the Middle East as compared to the West.
The West accepts a centralization of power under dictatorial regimes in
the Middle East, as long as those regimes use their power in predictable ways
that serve Western economic interests.*® The initial scramble for Arab oil in the
first part of the 20*“ century created Middle Eastern kingdoms that did not
question the West’s plans to exploit the oil. In the early 21®* century, not much
has changed from this general pattern as the small oil-rich nations continue to
strengthen their governments created by the West, oftentimes at the expense of
the ruled in those countries.*^
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Iraq is a good example of a dictatorial regime controlling the wealth of an
entire nation. Even though Iraq’s government is clearly anti-Western, Iraq still
demonstrates the standard pattern of a privileged few dominating a country’s
economy in the Middle East, whether pro- or anti-West. Iraq’s economy supports
a clique of Sunni Army officers, most of whom hail from Saddam’s hometown of
Tikrit. It is believed that more than 15% of the national budget for the past 20
years has been spent sustaining this elite group of Army officers.*®
In addition to a well-established pattern of small ruling groups dominating
national economies in the Middle East, there is also a historical pattern of under
development with the West. This is partially due to the type of political regimes
found in the Middle East. There is centralized control of the national economies,
and Arab leaders realize that economic progress brings with it threats to political
stability. The developmental process can produce social dislocation and strain
due to urbanization, can breed alienation among large segments of the
population, and creates pressure for more political participation.*® Also, the
Middle East may remain underdeveloped as compared to the Western countries
due to the historical pattern of external intrusions into their region. For example,
the Western dominance of Middle Eastern oil fields until the early 1970s could
also have contributed to the region’s slower economic progress.®® Today, multi
national corporations wield substantial influence in the region, and many would
accuse them of perpetuating Western economic domination of the Middle East.
Capitalist development of the Middle East has also exacerbated the
pattern of a small group of Arab rulers controlling the economies of a particular
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country. There remains a firmly entrenched set of elites in the region unwilling to
change its behavior. Because the region was underdeveloped to begin with,
capitalist development has required that governments and businesses rely on
foreign investment to expand their production sector of raw materials. This has
placed these underdeveloped countries a permanent “step behind" since they get
bogged down in a cycle of debt and in a subordinate position as compared to the
highly industrialized capitalist nations.®’ The Middle Eastern nations who chose a
path of socialist development rather than capitalism such as Libya, Iraq, and
Egypt (under Nasser) have also found progress to be slow due to bureaucratic
competition and inefficiency.®®
The inequitable distribution of oil and to a lesser extent the different
approaches to economic development (socialist vs. capitalist) have led to a
division in the Middle East of “have” and “have-not” nations. Table 1 shows the
disparity between the countries of the Middle East in terms of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita (in year 2000 US dollars).®® Not only is the division
between rich and poor nations obvious, but these numbers also show that even
the richest Middle Eastern nation (the UAE) is nowhere near the economic
development and purchasing power of the US.
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Table 1
Disparity in Average Incomes in the Middle East
Countrv

2000 GDP oer caoita

UAE
Qatar
Israel
Bahrain
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Oman
Turkey
Iran
Lebanon
Egypt
Jordan
Syria
Iraq
Yemen

$22,800
$20,300
$18,900
$15,900
$15,000
$10,500
$7,700
$6,800
$6,300
$5,000
$3,600
$3,500
$3,100
$2,500
$820

$36,200
United States
Source: CIA World Factbook 2001
The capital-rich oil nations that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) have become
increasingly isolated from the rest of the region as a result of their economic
success and close ties with the West. They are now faced with two choices: a
more equitable sharing of oil revenues among the Middle Eastern nations, or a
continued reliance on outside assistance (mainly from the US) to maintain the
regional status quo.®*
In addition to the disparities between average income in the Middle East,
there is also maldistribution of income within countries. In Egypt, nearly a third of
their population (about 19 million people) live below the poverty line, which is
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defined as $30/month.®® So while the average income in Egypt is $3600 a year,
close to a third of the population actually only makes less than $360 a year. This
inequitable distribution of income results from a cumbersome bureaucracy, rising
inflation, poor education and overpopulated urban areas. Egypt is not alone with
its problems of income distribution. Much of the wealth in the Middle East is
concentrated in the hands of a few elite leaders and businessmen.
The economic structure of the Middle East can be simplified into a couple
of patterns of behavior that will affect US foreign policy-makers. One is that there
are core groups of elites that control Middle Eastern countries both economically
as well as politically. This is a very significant pattern to identify because in
general, foreign policy decisions made by the US will be interpreted and acted
upon by the Arab elite, not by the general populace. Arrangements or decisions
between the US and a particular Middle Eastern country can be controlled by the
ruling elite and then they can turn around and mislead their own population about
the arrangement. This is aided by the use of state-run media in many Middle
Eastern countries. One example of this is Iraq's ability to take the heat off of
Saddam Hussein and his clique of officers for the economic disaster that US
sanctions have caused. While Saddam and his military still enjoy economic
luxuries, the population is swayed to believe that the US is single-handedly to
blame for their economic hardships. Iraqi leadership works diligently to ensure
scarce resources are tunneled to the loyalists of the Takriti tribe, security
agencies, and the military leadership. At the same time, Saddam completely cut
off the northern part of the country (Kurdish region) to save resources.®® The rest

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

of the population suffers heavily under sanctions (discussed further in Chapter 5)
however, the state-run media and internal security forces ensure that the
population is led to believe their troubles come from the Americans, not from
Saddam’s actions.®^
The other patterns that are important for US policy-makers to keep in mind
are the division of oil-rich and oil-poor nations in the Middle East, and the
underdeveloped nature of the Middle East population as a whole. US support for
oil-rich nations at the expense of the oil-poor nations further divides the region as
well as solidifies the perception that US foreign policy in the region is solely
based on economics without any regard for the Middle Eastern people. This
perception of US foreign policy in the Middle East continues to plague policy
makers today and is partially to blame for the rise of anti-US terrorist groups.

Arab-lsraeli Imbroglio and Polarization in the Region
Another key reason for the rise of anti-US terrorist organizations and a
general anti-Western attitude in the Middle East has been the US role in the
Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. This longstanding conflict has polarized the region and
continues to be an important regional consideration for US policy-makers when
analyzing foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. The emotions surrounding
this issue are so volatile and resonate with so many people throughout the region
that one cannot make a foreign policy decision that is not affected by the Arablsraeli conflict in some way. The issue is so important that US policy-makers
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must be aware of how the US is perceived in this conflict and what effect that has
on US foreign policy.
The Arab-lsraeli conflict has its origins with World War I, after which the
British promised both the Arabs and the Jewish population in the region an
independent homeland in Palestine. British policy in Palestine from the
beginning was unclear, and conflict was inevitable. When the British were still
grappling with the contentious Palestinian situation after World War II, they let the
matter be decided by the fledging United Nations. The UN, through a partitioning
of Palestine, created the State of Israel in 1948. Israel became a colonial
foothold in the Middle East for the Western powers, in close proximity to the
world’s largest source of oil. More significantly, the creation of Israel caused the
displacement of 750,000 Palestinians, who became exiles from their own land
and fled into neighboring Arab countries.®® The displacement of Palestinians in
turn spawned the rise of radical political organizations such as the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and became the single most important rallying
point for Arab states in the Middle East. Several major wars broke out between
the Arabs and Israelis—the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Six Day War in 1967, and
the October War in 1973. The Camp David Accords of 1978-79 were an attempt
at peace between Egypt and Israel, but they failed to resolve the underlying
contradictions of the Arab-lsraeli conflict such as a solution to the Palestinian
problem, and thus failed as a comprehensive peace plan.®® The Palestinian
"intifada” launched against Israel in December 1987 began an ongoing series of
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low-level yet still deadly clashes between the two sides that continues to this
day.®®
The Arab-lsraeli imbroglio has been a key factor in shaping the structure
of the Middle East regional subsystem. Up until the 1970s, the conflict helped to
focus the pan-Arab movement. Even nations not directly involved in the conflict
formed a “cooperative core” of states that conducted high-level summits and
worked together to redistribute wealth and push for Arab unity.®’ For example,
the League of Arab States and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (GAPEC) were both created around this time. The Arab-lsraeli conflict
provided structural focus for the Middle East subsystem into the 1970s. Later in
that same decade however, the regional subsystem began to fragment
(discussed in the next section) and the scope of the Arab-lsraeli conflict became
more localized. The balance of power shifted more towards Israel, and Arab
support for the Palestinian cause began to wane. Despite the decline in regional
focus, the Arab-lsraeli conflict still remains one of the most enduring patterns in
the region today.®®
The West’s involvement in this imbroglio, and specifically US involvement,
has almost single-handedly shaped public opinion of the West by Arabs in the
Middle East. The US uses its alliances with “friendly” conservative Arab regimes
to undermine broader Arab efforts against Israel.®® Unabashed support for Israel
(discussed further in Chapter 3) at the expense of the Palestinians or other Arabs
has led to a serious perception problem for US policy-makers. The perception of
the US is that of a “ruthless and arrogant” superpower biased against Islamic
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values. A recent Gallup poll (December 2001/January 2002) found that 53% of
Muslims polled had an unfavorable opinion of the US, and only 22% had
favorable opinions (residents of Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon,
Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were polled). Sixty-one percent felt
that Arab groups did not cause the September 11 terrorist attacks, leading a
majority of Muslims in those countries (77%) to condemn US military action
against Afghanistan as “morally unjustified." Moreover, 15% of those polled
claimed the September 11*“ attacks on the US were morally justified.®*
This Muslim perception of the US as a world leader with goals opposite
those of the Middle Eastern nations stems in large part from the Arab-lsraeli
imbroglio and US support for the Israeli cause over the Palestinian cause. This
perception is of course an unhelpful one when the US is trying to achieve foreign
policy goals in other countries in the Middle East. US policy-makers need to
understand the significance of the Arab-lsraeli pattern in the region and the effect
it has on many other issues in the Middle East. Oftentimes the special
relationship between the US and Israel undermines US credibility with the Arabs,
thus making diplomatic negotiations difficult. As a result, the Arab-lsraeli
imbroglio remains one of the most important regional considerations for US
policy-makers in the Middle East.

A Fragmented System
Just as the Arab-lsraeli dispute divides the Middle East into different
camps, the region is also fragmented within the Arab and Muslim community by
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conservative and radical regimes. The fragmented nature of the region affects
foreign policy actions conducted by the US because the conservative and radical
camps will interpret foreign policy decisions differently. The Middle East
subsystem is also less capable of exerting power on the global scene because of
the fragmentation in the region.
This divisiveness in the Middle East had its origins at the beginning of the
Cold War. The cleavage between the conservative and radical regimes is a
political, not religious, one that was exacerbated by the division between the
Western and Eastern blocs during the Cold War.® When the Cold War ended in
the 1990s, the ideological differences of the two Middle Eastern camps lingered
on. The “conservative” camp is defined by the monarchies, sultanates and
emirates created in the colonial era. They have a vested interest in promoting
traditionalism, and promoting Islamic orthodoxy.® Although conservative regimes
are anti-secular, they maintain close ties with the secular West to aid in their
economic development and for security purposes. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE fit the mold of a conservative regime.
The “radical” nations are usually secular, run by revolutionary regimes,
with significant influence by the military. They are also defined as promoting
socialism and using Islam as a tool of the state. Currently Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
Iran (although it is not secular), and to some extent Egypt are considered radical
regimes.®^ In the post-Cold War era however, Egypt and Yemen are making a
concerted effort to revise their relations with the West, especially the US. For
example, Yemen has been extremely cooperative in working with the US in
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searching for terrorists in their country after the September 1

attack. This

cooperation includes potentially sending US troops to Yemen to train their
military forces in counter-terrorism tasks, as well as intelligence sharing efforts.®
Egypt under President Mubarak has also improved relations with the US, to
include conducting ever-expanding military exercises with US and other regional
military forces every two years.® Vice President Dick Cheney remarked during a
recent visit to Egypt: “There is a close friendship between our two countries.
Egypt is a vital strategic partner for the United States... Americans are grateful for
the assistance our coalition has received from Egypt.”^° The remaining countries-Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan-do not neatly fit into the ideological
division of conservative or radical states, but rather have characteristics of both
sides.
In the 1950s and 60s, the Middle East was full of ideological fervor from
pan-Arabism to socialism. The ideological divide fell between pro-Western
republics and monarchies and the progressive, military regimes. Most inter-Arab
conflict from 1945-81 was between the two camps, but the ideological divide did
serve to soften the differences of countries within each camp.^^ By the late 1970s
and 80s, the Middle East had disintegrated into local subsystems loosely
connected to one another within a regional subsystem.

There was a brief period

in the 1970s when cohesion among the Arabs was created by the boycott of
Israel and the oil embargo, but the aggregated power in the region did not last
long. By the end of the 1970s, the Middle East subsystem had fragmented. The
loss of focus was caused by the leadership gap left by Nasser’s Egypt.
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Moreover, support for the PLO was waning, local issues began to eclipse
regional ones, and the economic gap between oil and non-oil producing countries
widened/^
The effects of the fragmentation of the Middle East subsystem are many.
First, it weakens the ability of the region to resist external intrusions and has led
to an increase in the presence of external powers (mainly the US) in the Middle
East. For example, today there are US military forces stationed in Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and other countries. Second, there is a regional loss of
power in the ability to influence the policies of other states and regions. The
division in the Arab world has led to a decline in African support for the Arab
position in Palestine.^'* Third, regional fragmentation has inadvertently boosted
Israel’s position because the Western powers have been able to concentrate on
narrow commercial interests in the region as a result of the divided Arab position
rather than get involved with the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. And finally, there has
been a decline in regional dialogue on economic and political issues. For
example, the Arab League’s “Afro-Arab Dialogue” and the “Euro-Arab Dialogue”
were frozen in the 1980s.^®
For Iraq specifically, the fragmented Middle East subsystem drove them
away from the rest of their Gulf neighbors. Even before the Iran-lraq War, Iraq
felt isolated from the pro-West conservative Gulf oil monarchies and Iran (since
Iran was a pro-West regime at the time too).^® The Ba th Party goals of socialism,
pan-Arabism, self-sufficiency from the West, and their support of the Palestinians
led them in a different foreign policy direction from the rest of the Gulf states. At
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the same time, the Gulf monarchies were distancing themselves from Iraq and its
military regime under Saddam Hussein. Saddam drove the ideological divide
even further by accusing the conservative regimes of being weak in their support
of the PLO, and he frightened the Gulf states with talk of Iraq becoming the
"protector” of Arab interests in the Gulf.^
The feud between Iraq and its Persian Gulf neighbors underscores the
divisive nature of the Middle East over the last few decades. The conservative
vs. radical regime division fundamentally shapes the region today and must be a
consideration for US policy-makers. Although fragmented, the Middle East is still
a subsystem; thus US policies will affect the system as a whole rather than an
isolated part. Understanding how the conservative camp and the radical camp
will both interpret policies is equally important for predicting a policy’s success.

Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, no list of regional
considerations for the Middle East could ever be all-inclusive. The six discussed
in this chapter are some of the most pervasive patterns and those that most
affect US policy-making. However, the region is not homogenous and there are
significant differences among the countries that make up the subsystem. In
short, the Middle East regional subsystem is made up of non-democratic
societies, shares notions of pan-Islam and pan-Arab cultural advancement, is
decidedly anti-Western and anti-imperialist, is economically disparate both within
the region and with the West, has an Arab-lsraeli imbroglio that overshadows
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many other issues, and is a fragmented system split between conservative and
radical regimes. These regional considerations have persisted in the region for
the last 50 years or more, and it is important that policy-makers examine these
regional patterns and analyze how they affect policy decisions made in the
Middle East.
Chapters 3 and 4 will examine US policy goals and strategy in the Middle
East, and will look at how these six regional considerations have affected past
policy decisions by the US. Then in Chapter 5 the case study of US sanctions in
Iraq will show how US policy is doomed to fail when policy-makers disregard the
broader regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem.
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CHAPTER 3

US GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
An assessment of US goals in the Middle East is now required in order to
show how the systemic nature of the region has impacted US policy-making.
This thesis asserts that US policy in the Middle East has not been successful
because US policy-makers do not account for the Middle East as a system when
setting policy goals and designing strategies to achieve those goals. This
chapter will examine US goals toward the Middle East in general as well as
toward Iraq and will show how the regional considerations discussed in Chapter
2 have affected these goals.
The US has a number of generalized goals in the Middle East as well as
specific objectives towards particular countries, in this case Iraq. The primary US
goals in the Middle East have generally been accepted as securing oil supplies
for US industry and the protection of Israel as a Jewish homeland.‘ A third goal
of containing “rogue” or radical regimes has also been proffered.^ In the Cold
War this goal took the form of containing communist or pro-Soviet Union
governments, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy-makers are
more concerned with containing anti-US regimes. A less defined goal that
encompasses the three mentioned above is to preserve stability in the region,
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which would in turn secure oil, protect Israel, and contain radical regimes
simultaneously. Preserving stability will be treated as an underlying objective to
all US goals in the region, and will therefore not be examined independently of
the three main goals.

Securing Oil from the Region
Preserving access to oil in the Persian Gulf is central to US global
strategy. Bruce Reidel, special assistant to President Clinton, said in 1998 that:
The Gulf region has been recognized by every American President since
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as an area of absolute vital strategic
importance for the United States. Not only is it the energy storehouse of
the world—home to two-thirds of the proven oil reserves of the globe—but
it is also the nexus where three continents come together...."
Since the end of the Cold War, oil prices have remained stable and prices have
been relatively low. The Middle East produced 27% of the world’s oil in 1986,
and this increased to 35% by 1996.® However, since the oil crises in the 1970s,
the US has encouraged the development of oil fields in other parts of the world.
Most of the Persian Gulfs oil now goes to Asia (Gulf oil is 80% of Japan’s
supply). Meanwhile the US imports oil mainly from Africa and South America
and only 16.1% from the Persian Gulf.®
Despite the relatively low percentage of oil actually imported from the
Middle East to the US, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf to Europe and Asia remains in the scope of American “vital interests.”
Keeping a steady flow of oil from the Persian Gulf ensures that worldwide oil
prices stay relatively low and stable, which is clearly important for the US
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economy. Oil was a primary reason for the US involvement in ousting Saddam
Hussein from Kuwait. While President Bush couched US involvement in terms of
the preservation of “our very way of life,” he would have been more correct to
add “our very way of life which depends on oil.”^
There were, of course, other reasons for US involvement in the Persian
Gulf War. Many in the US were concerned that Israel might preemptively strike
against Iraqi threats, sending the region into a major Arab-lsraeli war. Many
were worried about Iraq’s WMD capabilities, including the possibility of
possessing nuclear weapons. There were domestic pressures on President
Bush such as a severe recession and high unemployment that might be
overlooked during a war.® There was also a need for the US to restore the
population’s hope in its own military after years of “failures” such as the Vietnam
War, the botched rescue of the Iranian hostages, and the bombing of the Beirut
embassy.®
Despite the other reasons for waging war against Iraq in 1991, the US
primarily got engaged to protect the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the world. One
high official in President Bush’s administration summed up the objectives like so:
The occupation of Kuwait (by Iraq) isn't, in itself, a threat to American
interests. The real threat lies in the power Iraq would have in possessing
20 percent (Iraq + Kuwait) of the world’s resources of oil, controlling
OPEC, dominating the Middle East, threatening Israel and wanting to
acquire the atomic bomb.‘°
American forces had been sent to Saudi Arabia in 1990 to protect the world’s
access to oil, since Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq sat on 40% of the planet’s
proven oil reserves." It is highly unlikely President Bush would have risked
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another military failure and put his re-election on the line for a country that was
not located in one of the most strategically important places to the industrialized
world.
The goal of protecting the oil supply to the West is affected by several of
the regional considerations that make up the Middle East subsystem. First, the
economic structure of the region causes a division between oil producing
countries and non-oil producing countries. Obviously, the US will need to spend
more time maintaining close ties with the oil-producing nations, often at the
expense of the non-oil producers. This feeds into the overall negative perception
that the US has in the Middle East.‘^ These ties with friendly oil-producing
regimes will be examined later in this chapter.
Historically, a small number of ruling elites in the Middle East make the
majority of the economic and political decisions for their nations. This situation is
actually quite beneficial for the US in trying to secure oil flow because the ruling
elites personally benefit from close ties with the US just as much as the US
benefits from close, friendly ties with those elite groups. It is a win-win situation
for both sides, as long as the ruling elites can keep popular input to a minimum in
foreign policy decisions. Examples of cozy US ties with oil producers are Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti government uses its total control of the economy
to buy more weapons from the West than it actually needs because it is relying
on Western help to s u rv iv e .In Saudi Arabia, the kingdom pays for Western
political support by keeping the price of oil low. The West guarantees the
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continuance of the House of Saud in exchange for cheap oil and sales of huge
quantities of American, British and French military hardware/"
While the economic structure of the region makes the US goal of securing
oil easier, the fact that the majority of the people in the Middle East tend to be
predominantly anti-Western/American and anti-imperialist does pose a threat to
US oil goals. If these sentiments result in regime changes in the conservative
Arab world, then oil prices could swing out of control and the West will have a
difficult time stabilizing oil prices without the help of non-Arab and non-Muslim
OPEC nations. Fortunately for US policy-makers, the fragmented nature of the
subsystem in the last 20 years or so has allowed the US to maintain a steady
flow of relatively low-priced oil prices. The conservative regimes follow Saudi
Arabia's lead on oil pricing, to the benefit of Western interests.B ut this situation
is always subject to change with ever-fluctuating political and economic events in
the Middle East. Shifts in oil prices have historically also been tied to another
regional consideration—the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio. As the subsystem focuses
more on this issue, the region becomes more cohesive. Middle Eastern
governments may find it easier to assert their ability to raise oil prices as they
form a “united front.” Recent escalations in violence between the Palestinians
and Israelis could potentially lead to trouble down the road for US policy-makers
trying to maintain a steady flow of cheap oil from the region.
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Protecting Israel
Another major US goal in the Middle East is the protection of Israel. Every
US president as far back as Harry S. Truman has felt a special commitment to
Israel that has not been matched by a comparable commitment to any other
single state in the region or the w orld.Intense domestic pressure on US policy
makers by the six million Jewish citizens in the electorally vital states of New
York, California and Florida largely explains the determination of US support to
Israe l.Z io nist organizations have the best-organized and most influential lobby
in the country and they are almost completely responsive to the suggestions of
the Israeli governm ent.The US Jewish lobby is described in more detail later in
this chapter.
The US preference toward Israel is continued through the extensive
underwriting of Israel's security, including economic assistance, military
equipment, and public subsidies and tax deductions for private donations to
Isra e l.Isra e l receives generous amounts of US aid every year. Table 2 shows
the amount of non-military aid that Israel is slated to receive in 2002, as
compared to the other Middle Eastern nations. These numbers represent US
foreign aid provided by the Agency for Intemational Development (AID) through
the US State Department.^ This aid is intended to improve economic growth,
agriculture, health programs and promote democracy.
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Table 2
2002 Congressional Budget for Aid to the Middle East
Countrv
Israel
Egypt
Jordan
West Bank/Gaza
Lebanon
Morocco
Yemen

2002 US Aid
$720 million
$655 million
$150 million
$75 million
$32 million
$10.8 million
$5 million

PoDulation Aid per capita
5.9 million
$122.00
69.5 million
$9.40
$29.41
5.1 million
3.1 million
$24.19
3.6 million
$8.88
$0.36
30.6 million
$0.27
18.0 million

Source: US Agency for International Development website^’

Most notable is the fact that Israel has the third highest GDP per capita
(see Table 1 in Chapter 2), yet receives the most US aid in the region. The
poorest country in the region, Yemen, receives only 7% of the US aid given to
Israel, and the West Bank/Gaza area receives only 10% of Israel's total non
military aid from the US. Israel receives foreign aid from other countries, but
approximately 75-80% of their total foreign aid comes from the US.^^ Aid from the
US to Israel increased significantly after the October 1973 Arab-lsraeli war and
the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine in 1971. The Nixon administration decided
that the safest course for the US was to enhance Israel's military capabilities so
the Arab states would be forced to accept a settlement. In 1971, total US aid to
Israel was increased to five times the prior year's amount, equaling $600.8
million (of which $545 million was in the form of military assistance).^ The US
also had been supplying Israel with sophisticated military weaponry since 1967
(after the Six Day War) such as air defense missiles, tanks, and modern A4/Skyhawk and F-4/Phantom fighter aircraft.^"
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Israel’s dependence on US military and economic aid should give the US
significant leverage over Israeli policy. However, oftentimes domestic politics
preclude the US government from restraining Israeli actions that they publicly
disapprove of, and the Arab states are frustrated by this dichotomy. The special
US-lsraeli relationship has thus undermined relationships with other allies in the
region. There is a perceived US bias toward Israel in the Arab world. The fact
that Israel continues to occupy territory originally populated by the Palestinian
Arabs (until their eviction in 1948), has led to varying degrees of hostility toward
Israel by the Arab states in the region. The US refusal to criticize Israel's tight
closure of the West Bank and Gaza has led to a growing sense that Washington
has lost its sense of morality and sown the seeds of popular anger among even
its moderate Arab partners.^ The US has tried to overcome this dilemma by
supporting several moves toward peace and reconciliation between the Arabs
and the Israelis. However, Israel still receives diplomatic priority, and Israeli
support for the peace process usually involves US financial aid.^
Since US policy has also been to maintain Israel's military advantage over
its Arabs neighbors, it has become exceedingly difficult for the US to defend a
“neutral” position in the Arab-lsraeli peace process.^^ Some insist that US policy
is justified by the fact that Israel provides the US with a strategic, democratic ally
in the region. Others believe the preferential treatment of Israel threatens the
other US priority in the region: oil supply. The US commitment to Israel is often
in conflict with the cultivation of friendly Arab regimes to facilitate access to oil.^
US support for Israel has brought increased pressure from the Muslim world on
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the conservative Gulf states, which in turn jeopardizes the US presence among
them.^
To sum up, the US bias toward Israel in the Middle East has been evident
for at least the last 35 years.“ Israel has received an inordinate amount of US
aid, both direct and indirect, for decades. Despite the billions of dollars in aid and
military equipment, Israel is often not willing to comply with US demands. One
notable exception to this was during the Persian Gulf War when Israel was
convinced by the US that retaliating against Iraq (for launching SCUD missiles
into Israel) was not in the best interest of US policy goals in the region. However,
in the ongoing Arab-lsraeli peace process, Israel has frequently refused to
comply with US suggestions for peace. Most recently, during the April 2002
Israeli incursion into the West Bank, Israel ignored several US requests to
immediately withdraw from the occupied Palestinian towns. The preference of
US policy-makers toward Israel does not make sense strategically. Israel does
not have strategic resources that the US depends on, such as oil. The US does
not have forward operating bases in Israel from which to launch strikes against
Iraq and wage the war on terrorism. Instead, it is the Arab world in which the US
does rely on for oil and strategic military bases. However, the US relationship
with Israel damages its relationships with the rest of the Arab world.
The Arab Middle East is traditionally anti-Western/American and espouses
pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals. From a systemic perspective, the US protection
and support of Israel directly confronts these two regional considerations. This
makes it more difficult for US policy-makers to achieve success in their other two
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primary goals in the region: securing oil and containing radical regimes. The
Arab-lsraeli imbroglio automatically puts the US at odds with the Arab majority in
the Middle East because of the US support for Israel. However, because the
region is currently fragmented, nations are more often concerned about their own
self interests than greater pan-Arab unity. This mitigates some of the negative
aspects of US support for Israel. Also, the non-democratic nature of the region
aids the US in continuing its goal of protecting Israel because the Middle Eastern
governments can maintain friendly relationships with the US, despite a lack of
popular support for this friendship.

Containing Radical Regimes
In addition to the protection of Israel and threatening US access to Middle
East oil, the US pursues a third goal of “containing” radical or uncooperative
regimes. This goal originally stemmed from the Cold War as the US was forced
to recruit non-communist regimes into the pro-West camp. After World War II,
the US conducted policy in the Middle East loosely based around several
guidelines: maintain access to the regional resources, preserve stability and
peace, protect the new Israeli state, prevent Soviet expansion and establish
cooperative relationships with as many Middle Eastern nations as possible.®'
These last two “guidelines” resulted in the East vs. West tug-of-war that occurred
in the Middle East as each side tried to recruit countries into its camp. The
Truman Doctrine set the ideological blueprint for US involvement in the Middle
East. The doctrine had two objectives: contain the revolutionary movements in
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the underdeveloped world and maintain order and stability within the traditionally
class-oriented societies.®^ In 1958 this led to the Baghdad Pact, or formation of
the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). CENTO was a collective security pact
between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain (the US was not
mentioned by name in the pact). CENTO became part of the “worldwide warning
system” of security agreements designed to contain the revolutionary or openly
pro-communist regimes in the Middle East.®®
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s it was clear that the US must support
the “moderate” Arab elites instead of the radical nationalists, both to prevent
Soviet expansion and to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil fields. This meant
the radical nationalists in the region must be put on the defensive, and any new
revolutionary challenges must be contained.®" Even after the Cold War ended in
the early 1990s, the US still considered it an important goal in the region to
contain the radical regimes that potentially threaten access to oil or preservation
of the state of Israel. However, the reasons provided to contain these regimes
have changed: now the US must stop these radical regimes from producing
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or acting aggressively against their
neighbors.
Today there are five “rogue" regimes in the region that have anti-US/antiWest ideologies and objectives: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and Sudan. The US
strategy to contain the most notorious of these regimes is encapsulated by the
“dual containment” policy for both Iraq and Iran. In 1999, the US Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs defined dual containment as:
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Needed to shift away from our earlier policy of relying on one of these
regional powers to balance the other, a policy we had followed throughout
the previous decade with disastrous results. Rather, we would now focus
our efforts on containing Saddam Hussein’s threats to his neighbors and
his own people, while at the same time pursuing multilateral efforts to
prevent Iran from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction
and the ballistic missiles necessary to deliver them.®®
The US open hostility toward these regimes and stated policy goals to
“contain” them, especially Iraq, have antagonized even the closest US allies in
the region.®® For example, after the US missile attack on Iraq in 1996, there were
significant splits in the coalition between the US and conservative or
“cooperative” Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia withheld public support for the attacks,
and there was widespread criticism elsewhere in the Arab world. The criticism
was based on the fact that the strikes were a violation of the territorial integrity of
a sovereign Arab nation. The strikes were also causing further suffering of the
Iraqi people, who were already struggling because of economic sanctions.®^
More recently. President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the “axis of evil”
in his 2002 State of the Union address:
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming
to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
catastrophic.^
This statement makes it even more difficult for the conservative regimes to
publicly proclaim a pro-US stance without simultaneously rejecting their Arab and
Islamic neighbors in Iraq and Iran.
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US pro-Israeli and anti-radical policies have increasingly alienated one of
the most important allies of the US in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia. Strikes on
Iraq, along with increased Israeli attacks on the Palestinians have turned the
Saudi public against the US to some extent.®® As a result, Saudi leaders have felt
the need to distance themselves from the US and have recently begun to turn
down certain US demands (such as launching aircraft from Saudi airbases to
strike Iraq). A senior Saudi official said; “We are not American lackeys. We have
good relations... but we are not Guatemala.”"®
Containing the radical regimes in the Middle East has been affected by
several of the regional considerations that make up the Middle East subsystem.
First, recruiting the conservative Arab regimes while alienating the other Arab
regimes directly confronts the serise of pan-Arab and/or pan-lslamic loyalty that
is pervasive in the Middle East. The US is essentially asking for Arabs to support
or at least abstain from the US effort to contain radical Arab regimes, which
includes dropping bombs on Iraq. This is a difficult thing to ask the conservative
regimes to do, especially when their populations are increasingly voicing anti-US
opinions. As mentioned in the other sections, the continued fragmentation of the
Middle East subsystem works in favor of the US because the region is not
aggressively pursuing pan-Arab or pan-Islamist goals at this time. However, the
longer the US continues to pursue the radical regimes, especially Iraq and Iran,
and the more it continues to do so unilaterally, the greater the chance is of the
traditionally conservative regimes being forced to break with US policy goals.
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Goals Toward Iraq
In addition to the overarching policy goal of containing radical regimes, the
US has specifically constructed policy goals for Iraq since 1991. In addition to
simply “containing” Iraq, a more specific objective under this goal for Iraq since
Desert Storm has been the prevention of further Iraqi aggression against its
neighbors."' Initially this was the most important goal for US military forces after
Desert Storm, especially since it seemed that Iraq remained committed to
regional domination despite its defeat in the Gulf War. Another goal was
preventing a buildup of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. This goal has been
slowly elevated to the top of the US' concerns regarding Iraq. Referring to Iraq,
President Clinton declared in 1998: “...their (WMD) proliferation constitutes an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States.”"^ In the 2002 State of the Union, President Bush
said:
Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror.
The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and
nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already
used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the
bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that
agreed to intemational inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is
a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world."®
Finally, a third goal of US policy toward Iraq has been to topple Hussein's
regime. While this goal is not usually openly discussed for fear of backlash
among the Arab allies, the US has focused on Saddam Hussein himself as a
threat to the region.""
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Preventing Iraqi aggression and controlling Iraq’s WMD programs are
goals that are generally in line with the regional considerations of the Middle East
subsystem. In general, the Middle Eastern nations do not want to see Iraq attack
an Arab or Muslim neighbor, nor would they support Iraq’s use of WMD.
However, the US goal of toppling Saddam's regime is definitely affected by the
systemic nature of the Middle East. Changing the government in Iraq could
radically alter the subsystem. A post-Saddam Iraq could result in an Arab nation
more in line with the conservative Gulf states and their goals. A post-Saddam
Iraq could result in a regime that resumes a threatening posture against Kuwait
or Iran and reinvigorates old hostilities. A post-Saddam Iraq might be pro-West,
or anti-West, or neutral. The bottom line is that a change in Iraqi leadership
would produce significant changes in the Middle East subsystem, especially from
the viewpoint of US policy-makers.
This uncertainty has led to some degree of anxiety on the part of the
conservative Middle Eastern states and other countries outside the region. In
large part this is due to the popular reactions opposing a US attempt to oust the
leader of an Arab nation. Saudi Arabia is also concerned that a new government
in Iraq might increase Shiite Muslim influence and further destabilize the region.
Turkey is suspicious of plans that might increase the military capabilities and
political strength of the region’s Kurdish population."® Russia and China are very
sensitive to any US efforts to foster internal unrest in Iraq due to each country’s
fear of recognizing and legitimizing insurgents."® Overall, many nations are
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fearful of the unknown consequences a new Iraqi regime may bring, and many
get nervous when the US publicly discusses wanting to oust Saddam Hussein.

Global and Domestic Constraints on US Goals
There are other constraints on US policy-makers in addition to the regional
impact on US goals in the Middle East. Constraints occur at both the global and
domestic levels of analysis. These constraints are worth describing in this thesis
because of the impact they have on US policy-making. However, international
and domestic pressures are more likely to be taken into account by policy
makers than are the regional considerations. US policy-makers will usually be
well versed on how much support a certain policy has in Washington D C.,
among important lobbying groups, or what the major international players'
position is on the policy. The policy may be studied to a lesser extent at the
regional level, especially in the Middle East where the US has enjoyed almost
hegemonic power since the end of the Cold War.
Globally, it is much harder for the US to operate unilaterally in the postCold War environment. When the international system was bipolar, the US could
make policy decisions that affected the Western camp with much less regard to
the positions of other Western countries than in today’s post-Cold War world.
After all, the US was one of only two superpowers and shouldered much of the
burden of defending the Western world on its own. US politicians did not
consider it as imperative to seek and obtain UN approval before taking action
against another country such as Vietnam. This is not to say that the US was able
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to act with impunity or did not concern itself with the opinion of the international
community. However, in today's world the US must compromise with many more
nations participating in international politics and many of these nations are not
adverse to publicly diverge from US policies. It must sway the four other
permanent members of the UN Security Council—Russia, China, France, and
Britain—as well as a multitude of nations with interests in the Middle East. The
most recent violence in 2002 between the Israelis and Palestinians underscored
the fact that many European nations are not afraid to differ publicly with US
policies in the Middle East (the EU was openly much more critical of Israeli
actions than the US).
Although traditionally allies with the US, Western European policies in the
Middle East have diverged from US policies in recent years. France has been a
vocal opponent of sanctions in Iraq since the mid-1990s. France, Germany and
the rest of the European Union have called for a possible arms embargo and
trade sanctions against Israel due to the April 2002 Israeli incursion into the West
Bank.'*^This is a much tougher stance against Israel’s actions than the US has
been willing to make. Germany and Japan have also been searching for a
surrogate oil power in the Gulf to latch onto, thus allowing them to bypass the
traditionally dominant position US oil companies have in the region.'’®In the postCold War world, Western Europe (and Japan) will continue to compete with the
US for access to oil, thus placing a constraint on US policies in the Middle East.
Domestically, the US is constrained by several factors, one of which is the
strength of the US Jewish lobby. Jewish lobbying groups such as American
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Israel Public Affairs Committee (AlPAC), B’nai B’rith, and the United Jewish
Appeal have been active in every election campaign, and have a wellcoordinated national network. Each member of Congress is certain to receive
regular visits from prominent rabbis and laypersons from his or her district or
state. Politicians in the highly populous states of California, New York and
Florida have to focus their attentions on garnering the influential Jewish vote.
These Jewish groups have great capacity to shape the legislative agenda and to
promote in both houses resolutions for pro-Israeli positions.'*® The Israeli
embassy in Washington is also very adept at maintaining close relationships with
members of Congress, and is considered to be one of the most effective
diplomatic missions in the US.®*The Arab embassies have not had as much
success as Israel’s, and pro-Arab lobbying groups are much smaller in terms of
financial backing and the capacity to influence US policy-makers. Part of this is
due to the shorter tenure of the pro-Arab organizations, smaller memberships,
and the inability to reach as many citizens and lawmakers as the larger, well
established Jewish lobbies.
Another constraint on US policy-making in the Middle East is the influence
of public opinion (shaped by the media). Instead of analyzing the region and
acting in terms of actual options and constraints, many politicians base their
positions on what they think the public or the media would prefer and consider
reasonable.®* The result is that popular policies can be passed, with little regard
to the actual consequences in the region. This leads to policy decisions that may
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not be well thought-out and are subject to change as the administrations
changeover in Washington.

Conclusion
In short, US goals in the Middle East have been threefold. One goal is to
preserve the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the US, Europe, and Asia.
The second goal is to protect the security of Israel as a strategic ally of the US.
The third goal is to contain radical or rogue regimes in the Middle East, which
have the ability to directly threaten either of the first two goals. Ultimately all
three of these goals are interconnected in the region. For example, the Persian
Gulf War was fought to contain and eradicate Iraq’s hostile intentions toward
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The war was also fought to keep an uninterrupted flow
of oil to Europe, Japan, and the US. And the war was fought to protect Israel
from Saddam Hussein’s threats and menacing WMD program. Another example
is the pivotal relationship the US pursues with Saudi Arabia. This policy attempts
to achieve two goals simultaneously; securing oil from the largest oil exporter in
the world and containing radical regimes such as Iraq and Iran through the
support (or at least non-interference) of Saudi Arabia. Recently the Saudi
government has taken a harder policy stance against any unilateral US hostilities
toward Arab countries such as Iraq. However, US politicians still recognize the
important role Saudi Arabia plays in the US ability to achieve its policy goals in
the Middle East.
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Overall, the US seeks to maintain stability in the region, and has found it
necessary to use many different strategies in order to accomplish this, which will
be discussed in Chapter 4. All of these goals, however, are affected by global
and domestic constraints as well as the unique regional considerations of the
Middle East subsystem. Some of these regional patterns are helpful to US
policy-makers, and some are hindrances to achieving US goals. The more US
policy-makers understand how these regional characteristics affect US goals, the
more likely the US will be able to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 4

US STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
In addition to US policy goals in the Middle East, the strategies and
actions used to achieve those goals are also affected by the regional
considerations of the Middle East subsystem. In many cases, the systemic
characteristics of the region have a more profound effect on US policy-making
during the implementation stage of the policy. Strategies are implemented in
order to produce an effect that US policy-makers hope will ultimately lead to the
attainment of policy goals. Understanding the effect that regional considerations
in the Middle East have on these policy strategies is vital to ensuring policy
success. This chapter will outline the salient US policy strategies in the Middle
East over the last 25 years, and will examine how regional considerations have
affected these strategies.
In pursuit of the US goals toward Iraq and the Middle East in general,
there have been a number of different strategies employed to reach these policy
goals. One way the US has attempted to reach its goals is through the
appeasement of unsavory regimes that are still favorable to US interests in some
way, such as being the enemy of an enemy (Iraq in the 1980s). Another strategy
has been to undertake close cooperation with the conservative Arab Gulf states

75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, etc. A third strategy has been
economic and military sanctions, which are used to force recalcitrant regimes
such as Iraq to comply with US or international community objectives. Finally, a
fourth strategy has been to commit US military forces in order to achieve US
goals, such as the Gulf War and continued patrolling of the no-fly zones over
Iraq.

Appeasement
One way the US has tried to achieve its policy goals in the Middle East is
through appeasing regimes that are undesirable with the US in terms of the type
of government or policies they embrace, but useful in fighting a common enemy.
For example, US strategy toward Iraq in the 1980s was one of appeasement due
to Iraq's involvement in a war against America’s newest enemy, Iran. In the
1970s and early 1980s, US-lraqi relations were very hostile. But after the rise to
power of an anti-US regime in Iran, the US needed to rethink its relationship with
Iraq, which ushered in a period of appeasement between the US and Iraq. While
there are other less significant cases of the US appeasing undesirable or even
hostile regimes in order to achieve policy objectives, a more detailed look at the
US appeasement of Iraq in the 1980s is warranted for this thesis.
Traditionally, the US had played the strategic triangle in the Gulf (Iran,
Iraq, and Gulf monarchies) off one another to achieve its policy goals. Between
1958-1978, Iraq's radical pro-Soviet regime was a nemesis of the West, and the
fundamental differences between the US and Iraq made a clash seem
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inevitable.* Therefore, the US courted Iran and the Gulf monarchies, primarily
Saudi Arabia, to keep Iraq’s Ba’thist regime in check. The situation changed
radically, however, when the Ayatollah Khomeini took over power in Iran.
The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1978-79 allowed Iraq to play a more
prominent position in both the Gulf and the Arab world. First of all, the most
formidable obstacle to Iraqi ambitions in the Gulf had been removed (the Shah),
and second, the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini brought Iraq and the Arab Gulf
states closer together.^ Also, as a result of the peace treaty signed by Israel and
Egypt in 1978, de facto leadership of the Arab League had passed to Iraq.®
Meanwhile Iraq continued to harshly criticize US policy in the region such as
support for Israel, and it had lingering suspicions about US support for the
Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq."
The fundamental differences between Iraq and the US seemed to be put
aside by many US policy-makers after the Iranian Revolution during which an
anti-US government was installed in Iran. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President
Carter’s national security adviser, said that America and Iraq wanted the same
thing, “a secure Persian Gulf.” The Wall Street Journal also softened its
approach to Iraq: “The rhetoric shouldn’t obscure the fact that Iraq, probably
more than any other Mideast nation except Israel, is embracing Western values
and technology.”®US commercial interests also encouraged a new approach
toward Iraq. After Iraq’s oil income zoomed upward in the mid-1970s, American
business headlines read, “Iraq Starts to Thav/’ and “The Dramatic Turnaround in
US-lraq Trade.” Brzezinski announced in April 1980, “We see no fundamental
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incompatibility of interests between the US and Iraq,” thus giving Saddam
Hussein the impression that the US might remain neutral if Iraq attacked Iran,®
Once Iraq was embroiled in a war against Iran the US began backing up
its softer rhetoric toward Iraq with actions as well. The US realized that it shared
a similar goal with Iraq despite their differences-the prevention of an Iranian
victory over Iraq. As a result, Iraq was removed from the list of terrorism
supporters in 1982, and full diplomatic relations were restored by 1984.^ Also in
1984, the US began sharing intelligence information from US satellites and Saudi
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft with Iraq, which made a
huge difference in Iraq’s ability to bring the war to a successful conclusion.®
When Israel preemptively struck Iraq’s fledgling nuclear reactor at Osiraq in
1981, the US uncharacteristically condemned Israel’s action as “not in keeping
with international standards.”®Trade between the US and Iraq increased as well,
including the sale of Boeing aircraft, dump trucks, and food to Iraq. Iraq became
the second largest export loan recipient and the seventh largest subsidy
recipient, receiving about $4 billion in the 1980s.*®
By contrast, Iraq made few concessions to America during this time, and it
even accused the US of conspiring to prolong the war and weaken Iraq through
arms sales to Iran. US and Israeli covert arms shipments to Iran in 1985 and
1986 overshadowed the improvements in US-lraqi relations. Although the US
was openly discouraging other nations from providing arms to Iran (especially
after Iran had rejected a UN ceasefire proposal in 1983), this secret US policy
was obviously seen as a betrayal by Iraq.** Later President Reagan admitted the
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arms sales to Iran were intended to help bring the Iran-lraq war to an end,
although many analysts believe the US was also very concerned about a total
Iranian defeat by Iraq.*^
Iraq escalated the war in 1985 by attacking Iranian oil tankers and
facilities, in the hopes of forcing the US to intercede since the flow of oil from the
Gulf was being threatened. Iran struck back at Iraq's allies, namely Kuwait, so
the US sent warships to help protect Kuwaiti oil tankers transiting the Persian
Gulf. As Iraq had hoped, this show of US strength against Iran was matched by
diplomatic efforts to end the war.*® Iran increasingly grew convinced that there
was a US-lraq military alliance developing (especially after a US warship
accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner), and thus decided to agree to a
ceasefire in July 1988.*"
The US policy of appeasing Iraq did not end with the conclusion of the
war. While Iraq issued anti-American statements and repressed its own
population, US policy-makers avoided confronting Iraq. As Barry Rubin
eloquently stated, “The merchants of ignorance preached that any criticism of
Iraq would bring a united Arab world to Baghdad’s defense...why go looking for
trouble?’*®When Iraq broke its promise not to use the Bell transport helicopters it
bought from the US for military purposes, the US didn’t criticize Iraq and sold it
60 more Hughes helicopters. As evidence surfaced of Iraq’s schemes to defraud
American banks to purchase weapons, the State Department cautioned the
Justice Department not to be too tough on the perpetrators.*®
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The Reagan and Bush administrations also resisted sanctioning Iraq for
human rights violations. The CIA provided the US State Department a report
showing Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988.
Secretary of State George Schulz publicly confirmed that the US had evidence of
Iraqi forces using nerve agents and mustard gas against the Kurdish population
within Iraq. There was a push in the US Congress to impose sanctions on Iraq
for these human rights violations, but with presidential elections around the
corner and US-lraqi business interests budding, the White House watered down
the sanctions proposal. The White House claimed that sanctions would be
“terribly premature and counterproductive, (endangering) billions of dollars of
business for US companies."*^
Therefore, even though Saddam Hussein continued to attack the US
verbally, US policy-makers sent signals of appeasement to Baghdad. Saddam
believed the US was behaving in a manner that showed it did not want
confrontation with Iraq. Barry Rubin summarized the impact of US policy as
such; “Each act of appeasement increased Iraq's boldness without ever
convincing it the United States wanted friendship.”*®
The US engaged in the concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”
with Iraq in the 1980s. This policy ended in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
There were some valuable lessons to be learned from this period of US foreign
policy in the Middle East, as outlined by Bruce Jentleson in his 1994 book.*® One,
standards of reciprocity need to be set and enforced to prevent an endless chain
of concessions with a potentially hostile regime. Two, proportionality should be
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maintained to ensure a balance between the support given and the threat faced.
Third, deterrent credibility must be maintained during appeasement.^
Appeasing the Iraqi regime, for example, or any hostile regime in the
region is a policy strategy that will be affected by some of the regional
considerations of the Middle East subsystem. The non-democratic nature of the
Middle East makes it easier for the US to implement inconsistent policies with the
touted US goals of democracy, territorial integrity and human rights. Popular
opinion in the Middle East is often negative towards the US for its appeasement
of hostile regimes for narrow economic or political purposes. Limited popular
input in the governments of the Middle East, however, prevents this negative
opinion from affecting US policy strategies. As long as favorable arrangements
can be made between the US and the regime in question, popular opinion can
largely be ignored. However, this consideration does appear to be waning, as
the amount of popular unrest increases in the Middle East.^* It is conceivable that
in the not-so-distant future, regimes in the Middle East will be more inclined to
listen to their own public opinion. This situation would make it much more difficult
for the US to implement policy strategies with hostile regimes (and friendly ones
too—perhaps even more so) based on narrow self-centered interests.
The fragmented nature of the Middle East also allows the US to create
inconsistent policy strategies and appease hostile regimes. If the region were
more cohesive, there might be a better chance that even the cooperative regimes
would not stand by and let the US implement inconsistent strategies that go
against regional pan-Arab or pan-lslamic goals. The region’s fragmented and
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non-democratic nature helps US policy decisions such as the appeasement of
Iraq succeed. However, in the end, policy strategies such as appeasing hostile
regimes do end up feeding into the popular anti-American attitude that is
prevalent in the Middle East. This in turn may have a negative overall effect on
all US policy decisions in the region.

Close Ties with Conservative Regimes
The US strategy of appeasing Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s to achieve its
policy goals ran concurrent with its strategy of maintaining close ties with the
conservative Gulf states in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The US has had ties with the Gulf monarchies since before World War II, when
the US controlled the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Since then the US has attempted
to strengthen its conservative allies such as Saudi Arabia in the region with
political, economic and military assistance, while attempting to contain the radical
regimes.
This has been a mutually beneficial strategy between the Gulf “petromonarchies” and the US. In 1970, the Nixon Doctrine became the strategy for
beefing up the military capabilities of US allies in the Middle East in order for
them to shoulder more of the burden of defending their territories from the
Soviets and the radical Arab states.^ This also provided a convenient way for the
US to ensure that petro-dollars from the Gulf states were recycled back into the
US economy. This meant increased arms sales to Saudi Arabia (and the Shah’s
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Iran) in the 1970s, to include selling them advanced aircraft such as AWACS and
F-15 fighter jets, as well as newer ground equipment.
A close relationship with the conservative Arab states has enabled the US
to secure oil from the region and to a lesser extent, protect Israel through the
preservation of stability in the region. These informal alliances have also allowed
the US the opportunity to contain the radical regimes through the use of the
conservative states' military bases and political support. However, the
maintenance of ties with non-democratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia (and Iran
until the revolution) has caused an inconsistency in US strategy. On the one
hand, the US espouses the principles of national self-determination, democracy,
and popular sovereignty. On the other hand, its closest ally is the Saudi
government that does not embody those principles.^
In the 1990s and early 21®* century it seems to be more difficult for the US
to maintain solid ties with even its oldest allies in the Middle East (with the
exception of Israel). US commitment to Israel at all costs and ten years of
bombing Iraq has forced even the conservative regimes to back away from US
support. Conservative and radical Arab states alike now oppose the robust US
military presence in the Gulf.^" Many Arab states, along with France, China, and
Russia, are now calling for a “shift from an active (search-and-destroy) phase of
disarmament to long-term monitoring” in Iraq, thus ending any hopes of
maintaining an international coalition against Iraq.^ In Saudi Arabia, public
hostility against the US is growing, and officials have begun to distance
themselves from the US. This growing hostility is a product of increased Israeli
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attacks on Palestinians throughout the 1990s, and a concurrent growth in the
anti-US Islamic community throughout the region.^
As with appeasement, close ties with cooperative regimes in the Middle
East have historically been aided by the fragmented and non-democratic nature
of the regional subsystem. These considerations allowed the US to enact policy
strategies while largely ignoring popular opinion in the Middle East. However,
negative public opinion of US policy is beginning to take its toll on the
conservative Gulf regimes, who see their own power base potentially threatened
by remaining “too friendly” with the US. If the region becomes more unified
(possibly centered around solutions to the Arab-lsraeli violence in the early
2000s) the US may be forced to change its policy strategies or risk losing some
conservative allies in the region. An increasingly anti-US Middle Eastern
population searching for pan-Arab or pan-lslamic solutions to the Arab-lsraeli
imbroglio will make it more difficult for the US to maintain close ties with the
conservative Arab states in the future.

Sanctions
The loss of support from conservative Arab states to the US also stems
from the effects of a third US strategy in the region, economic and military
sanctions. The sanctions against Iraq that have been in place since 1990 were
intended to bring Iraq into compliance with United Nations resolutions, but the
disastrous effect on Iraq's population has incensed many Arab nations.
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Economie and military sanctions against Iraq began in earnest with UN
Resolution 687, enacted once the US and an international coalition had defeated
Iraq. Resolution 687 retained the provisions of Resolution 661, which had
imposed an international economic embargo on Iraq after Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait. The embargo allowed Iraq to import supplies for civilian needs
upon approval of the UN Sanctions Committee.^^ Resolution 687 demanded four
things: 1) Iraq’s WMD capabilities had to be identified and destroyed, 2) Iraq had
to agree with Kuwait's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 3) Kuwaiti and other
nationals held by Iraq were to be repatriated, along with any stolen property, and
4) a Compensation Committee was established for war claims. Additionally, Iraq
was subject to a ban on all imports of weapons and weapons technologies until
the UN Security Council decided otherwise.^ After Iraq's non-compliance with
Resolution 687, and the expulsion of UN weapons inspectors from Iraq, the UN
passed Resolution 1284 in 1999. This Resolution called for the reinstatement of
weapons inspectors to Iraq in exchange for a lifting of the ceiling on the amount
of oil Iraq is allowed to export for “humanitarian” reasons.^
The plight of the Iraqi population suffering under the strain of economic
sanctions for the past ten years has caused the loss of Arab and international
support for this particular US strategy in the region. Some estimates have stated
that 500,000 Iraqi children have died since 1991 as a result of sanctions, and
others estimate the lack of food and medicine results in approximately 5,000
children dying each month.®® Iraq has been deprived of some $140 billion in oil
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revenue, resulting in hyperinflation, contributing to mass poverty, unprecedented
social and economic dislocation, and an extremely high rate of unemployment.®*
The US placed economic sanctions against Iraq ostensibly to force it to
comply with UN Resolutions. The first Bush administration then also added that
sanctions will remain in place until Saddam Hussein is ousted from power.®^
However, the result has been the unintentional punishment of the weakest and
most vulnerable members of Iraqi society since Saddam Hussein ensures that
the elite in Iraq receive all the resources they need or want. Saddam has also
been able to deflect blame for his country’s economic problems back on the US
as a result of sanctions. This has allowed him to keep a tight grip on power
domestically, and he has garnered wider Arab support by vilifying the US. United
States Congressman John Conyers, in a hearing before Congress, stated that
sanctions are “reducing the possibility of the people (in Iraq) from ever becoming
organized and increasing their resistance because obviously they are blaming us
(the US).”®®Thus, sanctioning Iraq has made it exceedingly difficult for the US to
achieve its goals toward Iraq since the Gulf War, one of which is the ultimate
removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Sanctions against Iraq will be discussed
further in Chapter 5.
Saddam’s ability to deflect blame for the hardship sanctions cause his
people is indicative of the non-democratic nature of the Middle East subsystem.
Because of limited, orderly popular input and a centrally controlled government,
the Iraqi people have little choice but to support their government and its
explanation for why the US is to blame for their hardships. Thus, the non-
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democratic nature of the region makes sanctions a less effective policy strategy
because of their limited use in changing a government’s behavior.
The struggle for pan-Arab or pan-lslamic unity and the anti-Westernism
prevalent in the region also can be detrimental to the success of US sanctions in
the region. Sanctions will ultimately affect the general population of a country,
contributing further to the already anti-US attitude of the region. And as in the
case of Iraq, leaders can then attempt to rally Arab or Muslim support for help in
fighting the imperialist West. Finally, economics will also impact the
effectiveness of sanctions. Due to the tightly controlled national economies run
by the Arab elite, sanctions will most likely impact the general population before
hurting the elite.

War
The final strategy employed by the US in the Middle East and in Iraq
specifically has been the use of military force. The most obvious example of this
strategy being used was in Desert Storm when the US used military force to evict
Iraq from Kuwait. Another example of this is the US and UK enforcement of
military sanctions in Iraq, or patrolling the no-fly zones. The US has used military
force against other Middle Eastern countries, but this thesis examines US policy
toward Iraq in a regional context, thus warranting a closer examination of the
Persian Gulf War.
The US relied on a strategy of appeasement with Iraq up until Saddam’s
forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The period preceding the invasion was
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full of signals from Saddam regarding his intentions to attack Kuwait, but the US
did not appear to be listening. In February 1990, Saddam Hussein asked the
leaders of Jordan and Egypt to inform the Gulf states that Iraq was not only
adamant on a complete moratorium on its Iran-lraq War loans, but urgently
needed an immediate infusion of additional funds ($30 billion). “Let the Gulf
regimes know that if they did not give this money to me, I would know how to get
it,” he added.®" In April 1990, five US senators traveled to Iraq and ended up
lionizing and pampering Saddam based on his victory over Iran.®® This only
served to further prove to Saddam that the US did not want a confrontation with
Iraq. Then in July 1990 Saddam accused the oil-producing countries, specifically
Kuwait, of exceeding quotas set by OPEC in a deliberate attempt to keep the
price of oil low. Iraq's economy had been devastated after the Iran-lraq War, so
Saddam perceived this as an economic war against Iraq.®® The US, still trying to
reach out to Iraq through appeasement, did not interpret the signals that Saddam
was sending about his plans to invade Kuwait. On the 25*'* of July, there was a
meeting between Saddam and the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. While
Saddam angrily talked of being threatened by Kuwait, Glaspie did not explicitly
tell him that the US would not sit by and watch him invade Kuwait. Saddam
misread her cautious reply to him as a green light to invade Kuwait.®^ On August
2,1990, he sent his forces into Kuwait, which resulted in the condemnation of the
US and the entire international community against Iraq. Less than six months
later, Iraq was facing the most impressive coalition of military firepower
assembled since World War II.
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Once the war started, the US committed its military wholeheartedly to the
attack against Iraq and brought a preponderance of military equipment and
troops to the international coalition that had been formed. US aircraft flew as
many as 3,000 to 4,000 sorties a day, using advanced aircraft such as the F-117
stealth fighter and high-tech precision-guided munitions. Overall, the US sent
75% of its active tactical aircraft, 42% of its tanks, 46% of its Marines, 37% of its
army, and 46% of its aircraft carriers.®® The US deployed the most ground troops,
250,000-300,000, with Saudi Arabia providing the second highest number of
troops, 75,000.®®
After the victory, many believed the US did not go far enough to topple
Saddam’s regime. The coalition leaders assumed that the combination of
military defeat and internal unrest as a result of the war would be enough to end
Saddam’s regime. In fact, for many years after the Gulf war, the US tried to
foment a coup in Baghdad."® Sanctions and the US strikes on Iraqi forces in the
no-fly zones were also intended to discredit Saddam’s regime and weaken his
personal protection forces. But as discussed earlier, it is much more difficult to
influence change in the Middle East due to its non-democratic nature.
The no-fly zone aircraft patrols were another example of the US strategy
to use military force against Iraq. The no-fly zones were set up under UN
Resolution 688 in April 1991, to restrict Iraqi military movement and protect the
civilian population of Iraq, especially the Kurds in the north."* For the past ten
years, the US has flown thousands of sorties using rotating US fighter and
bomber units that deploy to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait to patrol the northern
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and southern no-fly zones in Iraq. Iraq has remained for the most part defiant of
the no-fly zones, and US missiles and bombs routinely strike Iraqi air defenses.
In 1999, there were over 600 reported violations of the no-fly zones by Iraqi
military forces."^ Patrolling the no-fly zones has entailed having a significant US
military presence in the Gulf. For example, in 1999 alone, US and British forces
flew more than 6,000 sorties, dropped more than 1,800 bombs, and hit more than
450 targets in Iraq. The 200 airplanes, 19 warships, and 22,000 troops it took to
accomplish this cost the US taxpayer $1 billion that year alone."®
Once again, using military force to implement policy is going to be affected
by the regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem. Overall, the US is
working against some significant systemic characteristics when the decision to
drop bombs on a country is made. Obviously the decision to use military force
will not be greeted with blanket approval by an anti-American, anti-imperialist
region that still struggles to maintain a sense of pan-Arab unity. In the case of
the Gulf War, where an Arab country invaded another sovereign Arab country,
many in the region supported US military action. However, the continued US
bombing of Iraq over the past decade has caused support for this strategy to
wane among many Arab nations. The Arab-lsraeli imbroglio also negatively
affects the US' ability to wage war in the region without negative repercussions.
Unabashed US support of Israel makes most US actions in the region subject to
intense scrutiny and reluctant public acceptance.
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Conclusion
The US has implemented many types of policy actions in the Middle East
to achieve its policy goals. Some or all of the unique regional considerations that
make up the Middle East subsystem have affected these strategies. In general
there are some summary effects the region has had on US policy goals and
strategies. First, the fact that the subsystem is fragmented (into conservative
and radical regimes) has a positive effect on the implementation of US policy in
the region. Fragmentation weakens the relative power of the system from US
intrusions and unilateral policy decisions. This in turn decreases the second
effect of the pan-Arab and pan-lslamic nature of the subsystem on US policy. A
fragmented system is less prone to pursue pan-Arab goals that may deviate from
US policy goals. Third, the anti-imperialist/anti-American nature of the
subsystem has a harmful effect on US policy-making because of negative public
opinion toward the US. This ties into a fourth consideration regarding the Arablsraeli imbroglio and its dominant effect on the subsystem. US support for Israel
at the expense of the Palestinians also contributes to negative public opinion
toward the US, thus making policy implementation more difficult. A fifth
consideration is the economic structure of the region. The fact that small groups
of Arab elite make the economic decisions for their nations can have a positive or
negative effect on US policy-making. When it comes to securing oil or
establishing close ties with cooperative regimes, this structure can be very
helpful for the US. However, in terms of implementing sanctions, this can have a
negative effect because the population is made to suffer, not the governing elite.
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Finally, the non-democratic nature of the regional subsystem generally has a
positive effect on achieving US policy goals. This consideration allows US
policy-makers to concentrate on winning over the governments in the region, not
the general population, because of the limited amount of orderly participation in
government. Once again though, implementing sanctions is actually harmed by
this regional consideration since the effects of sanctions are less able to
penetrate the general population and promote change in the government.
This thesis has attempted to establish that the Middle East operates as a
regional subsystem, of which there are several regional considerations that can
be taken into account regarding that subsystem. These systemic regional
considerations will affect both the attainment of US policy goals and the
implementation of strategies to reach those goals. Failure to recognize or
adequately adapt to these regional considerations will probably lead to an
unsuccessful policy outcome for the US. Chapter 5 examines the US strategy of
sanctioning Iraq and look at the global, regional and domestic factors that affect
this policy. The examination will show that the regional considerations of the
Middle East and US policy structure are incompatible, thus contributing to failed
policy strategies.
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CHAPTER 5

POST-GULF WAR POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: AN ASSESSMENT
Introduction
In the first four chapters of this thesis, the Middle East has been described
as a regional subsystem, and the regional considerations that describe the
subsystem have been outlined. I have examined US goals and strategy in the
region, and looked at how the regional subsystem Impacts US policy. This final
chapter will take a closer look at one policy in particular: US economic and
military sanctions against Iraq since 1991. First, this chapter will show how US
sanctions policy has failed to meet the majority of its objectives in Iraq. In
addition to failing, the policy has also created additional problems of its own that
will be discussed. Finally, it will be shown that sanctions are a failed policy
because the policy did not take into account the regional considerations of the
Middle East. A systemic assessment of sanctions will show how the Middle East
subsystem has had significant impact on the outcome of this policy, and will
continue to impact future US policies in the region.

Sanctioning Iraq
Economic sanctions have practically become the default option in US
foreign policy since World War II.’ Sanctions have been an effective tool for
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change in some cases. For example, the case of apartheid in South Africa is one
such success story. The US and the rest of the international community began a
concerted effort to uphold United Nations (UN) sanctions against South Africa in
1986. Less than five years later. Nelson Mandela was released from prison and
the widely despised policy of apartheid was ended. South Africa's relatively
peaceful transition to democracy showed that if given enough time, sanctions can
work.^ However, the effectiveness cf sancticns is cften difficult to measure. It
requires a solid set of assessment criteria that answers the question: what is the
real purpose of the sanctions?®
Although a much more palatable option than military force, oftentimes
sanctions do prove to be ineffective. In some cases, they alter the target
country’s economy and internal politics in ways that make the country’s offensive
behavior even more difficult to reverse.'* The Secretary of the UN Sanctions
Committees wrote in 1995:
First, sanctions generally should not be employed as a permanent feature
of policy against any targeted country because the damage they are likely
to cause to the long-term infrastructure of that country may far exceed the
extent of the wrong committed.®
For example, Saddam Hussein is still firmly in power and thumbs his nose at UN
weapons inspectors after 11 years of US sanctions. So despite a decade of
sanctions, Saddam’s “offensive behavior” continues. There has also been
negative backlash from other Arab countries over continued sanctions in Iraq,
which will be addressed below.
Sanctions are basically a punishment tool used by one country to control
the behavior of another. However, this tool rests on the assumption that the
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target country is an entity capable of rational behavior.® The question is, what
happens when the target state is controlled by a leader who makes decisions
that are arguably irrational in the eyes of those who impose such sanctions?
Unfortunately for US policy-makers, the result appears to be that the best
intentions of US policy toward Iraq get lost in the translation. But in addition to
the effects of sanctions being skewed by Saddam Hussein, the regional
considerations of the Middle East also affect US sanctions in Iraq. The
subsystem effects on US sanctions policy will be discussed later in this chapter.

US Aims with Sanctioning Iraq
To assess the US sanctions policy toward Iraq, one must start with the
aims of that policy. Although they have evolved over the past 11 years, there
have generally been four primary objectives.^ First, Iraq should be contained
from further aggression against its neighbors (and to some extent its own
population). Second, Iraq’s buildup of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
should be halted, destroyed and prevented in the future. Part of this objective
has been to coerce Saddam Hussein into cooperating with the provisions in the
UN Resolutions that dealt with WMD. Third, Saddam Hussein’s regime should
be toppled. Initially after Desert Storm, there was some friction between US
politicians and military commanders on whether the US should march to
Baghdad and remove Saddam from power. A debate over this objective still
lingers today as many Arab countries friendly to the US oppose removing
Saddam and disrupting the balance of power in the region. And fourth, regional
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stability in the Middle East should be preserved and US interests protected.® The
next five sections will describe how economic and military sanctions in Iraq have
failed to achieve many of the objectives and have led to several negative
repercussions for US policy goals.

Non-Compliance with UN Resolutions
The second and fourth objectives (destroy WMD and preserve regional
stability) are not being achieved due to Iraq’s continued non-compliance with UN
Resolutions. UN Resolution 687, enacted at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf
War, demanded that Iraq comply with four tasks: identify and destroy its WMD
capabilities, respect Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty and border, repatriate any
POWs, and pay war claims.® The first task has proven to be the most difficult for
Iraq to comply with. In 1998, Iraq ceased all cooperation with UN weapons
inspectors. Iraq continues to defy most sections of Resolutions 687 and 1284
(passed in 1999 to reinstate weapons inspectors) and remains committed to
developing WMD and the capability to deliver them.’®
Prior to the dismissal of weapons inspectors in late 1998, evidence was
mounting that Iraq, despite its claims to the contrary, did not destroy its WMD
program. From the end of Desert Storm, Saddam was committed to neither
declaring his WMD arsenal nor cooperating in its destruction.” In 1995 the chief
of Iraq’s WMD programs defected and revealed that Iraq had manufactured and
loaded the lethal chemical agent VX on its weapons. It was only after this
defection that it became clear Iraq had also amassed a formidable biological
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weapons program, despite four years of intrusive inspections.’^ As these lessthan-effective inspections dragged on, Saddam actually forced concessions out
of the weapons inspectors by declaring several military sites as "presidential"
sites and thus off-limits. He also gained the tacit support of France, China and
Russia, which all became highly critical throughout the 1990s of both inspections
and sanctions. Therefore, despite the limited progress the UN had in destroying
elements of Iraq’s WMD arsenal early in the inspections process, there is
evidence that Iraq continues to retain much of its arsenal today and is continuing
to expand its WMD program.’ ®For Iraq, the loss of $25 billion in revenue (from
sanctions since 1991} appears to be a lower priority than retaining its arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons.’^ At least for the time being, it appears that
Saddam Hussein believes he is better off not complying with the UN Resolutions.

Saddam Hussein is Still in Power
The third and fourth objectives of US sanctions against Iraq (regime
change and regional stability) are also not being achieved due to the fact that
Saddam still maintains a firm grip on power and continually threatens US military
forces in the region. Economic sanctions directed at Iraq have not translated into
pressure against Saddam given the level of control he exerts over the population.
Saddam rules his country through fear and intimidation and surrounds himself
with loyal followers who are afraid to contradict him.’ ®In addition to retaining
political control, sanctions have enabled Saddam to have more economic control
over Iraq as well. Due to the devastating effects of sanctions, Saddam was
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forced to institute price controls to counteract hoarding and overcharging. He
also changed monetary policy and banned the use of older Dinar notes outside of
Iraq. This act claimed to be a fix for a counterfeiting problem, but in reality the
majority of older Dinar note holders were his nemesis, the Kurds in the north. So
this policy prevented the Kurds from trading across the border with neighboring
countries. The government was now able to use this increased control to punish
its enemies and potential sources of opposition to the regime.’®The devastation
from sanctions has also forced the Iraqi population to become more economically
dependent on the government. This has inadvertently added to a sense of
nationalism. One Iraqi told USA Today in 2000, “Any doubts I had about
Saddam are gone...Now I want him to stand up to the US for taking away my
power, my running water, and my daughter's childhood.”’^ Instead of weakening
Saddam’s grip on Iraqi society, sanctions have actually forced him to recentralize control over the economy and tighten his hold on Iraq.
Given this assessment of Saddam’s grip on power, it would seem
unrealistic to hope that sanctions would help to topple his regime. However, this
is exactly what many officials in the US government have been hoping for—that
sanctioning Iraq will force opposition forces in the country to rise up against
Saddam. President Clinton, in a statement presented to the House of
Representatives in May 1999, stated:
We are convinced that as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he
will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace of the region and
the security of the world. We will continue to contain these threats, but over the
long term the best way to address them is through a new government in
Baghdad. To that end, working with the Congress, we have deepened our
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engagement with the forces of change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more
effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people.’®
As mentioned in Chapter 3, President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union
address reiterated his desire to see a regime change in Iraq.’®The Iraqi
government knows that the US favors keeping sanctions in place until there is a
regime change; thus there's no incentive for Saddam to work with the US or
intrusive inspectors.^ Publicly tying sanctions to toppling Saddam has given him
little reason to cooperate, thus highlighting the futility of designing sanctions to
attack a country's fundamental identity or mission, which in this case is wrapped
up in Saddam Hussein himself.^’

Humanitarian Concerns
There are also some negative repercussions for the US from its sanctions
policy toward Iraq. One is the increasing humanitarian concerns for the Iraqi
population. The plight of the Iraqi population suffering under the strain of
economic sanctions has often been cited as reason enough to stop sanctioning
Iraq. There are some estimates that as many as 500,000 Iraqi children have
died since 1991 as a result of sanctions.^ The former UN humanitarian
coordinator for Iraq observed recently:
In addition to the scarcity of resources, malnutrition problems also seem to
stem from the massive deterioration in basic infrastructure, in particular in
the water-supply and waste disposal systems. The most vulnerable
groups have been the hardest hit, especially children under five years of
age who are being exposed to unhygienic conditions, particularly in urban
centers. The [World Food Program] estimates that access to potable
water is currently 50 percent of the 1990 level in urban areas and only 33
percent in rural areas.“
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Iraq’s health care system, once the most efficient and effective in the Middle
East, is now in shambles due to sanctions. Iraq's educational system declined
under sanctions and has been decimated by overcrowded classrooms, the lack
of school supplies, the lack of medical supplies, no heating or cooling systems,
and the lack of a professional teacher base.“
The humanitarian concerns that sanctions have produced are eroding
international and Arab support for US policies in the region. In response, the US
in 2002 cooperated with a UN Security Council resolution that allows the free
flow of humanitarian goods into Iraq without oversight of the UN. However, the
UN must still review a lengthy list of goods such as telecommunications and
information technology equipment. This newest resolution may ease some of the
humanitarian concerns related to sanctions, but it is unlikely to stop countries
such as France and Russia from pushing for a complete end to sanctions in Iraq.
The humanitarian crisis caused by sanctions has provided Saddam
Hussein a cause to rally his people around and a “Great Satan " to blame for his
people's suffering. Although lifting sanctions does not guarantee that Saddam
will improve the social conditions of Iraq's population, there is evidence that he
might. For example, before and after the Iran-lraq War, Iraq's government
worked at investing more resources to raise the standard of living for the average
Iraqi citizen (thus ensuring loyalty to the regime).“ Public spending rose from
$21 billion in 1980 to $29.5 billion in 1982. The majority of this budget increase
was spent on civilian imports to prevent commodity shortages during the Iranlraq War.“ Saddam started various construction projects as he tried to convert
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Baghdad from a medieval to a modern city. He could very well choose the same
path again if sanctions are lifted.

Heavy Toll on US Military
Another negative repercussion of sanctions is the heavy toll this policy
takes on US military forces. Military sanctions, in the form of two no-fly zones
over northern and southern Iraq, were instituted under UN Resolution 688 in April
1991 to restrict Iraqi movements and protect the civilian populations in the north
(Kurds) and south (Shi’as).“ With the exception of some help from British forces,
the US military has shouldered the majority of the burden of maintaining these
no-fly zones for the past 11 years. The US has flown thousands of sorties using
rotating US fighter and bomber aircraft units to patrol the northern and southern
no-fly zones. In 1999 alone, US and UK forces had flown more than 6,000
sorties, dropped more than 1,800 bombs and hit more than 450 targets in Iraq.
The 200 airplanes, 19 warships, and 22,000 troops it took to accomplish this cost
the US taxpayer $1 billion that year.“ Since the end of the Gulf War, the US has
spent over $8 billion containing Iraq (as of 2000). In addition to the monetary
cost, patrolling the no-fly zones provides a tremendous amount of wear and tear
on US military forces, especially US Air Force and US Navy aircraft.^ The
continual operations and the regular surges required to deploy to the region have
challenged military rotation and leave schedules. The inhospitable welcome
often given to Western forces further strains the military. Morale, retention, and
overall readiness have fallen as a result.®®
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In recent years, the frequency of Iraqi violations in these no-fly zones has
increased as Saddam continues to test the resolve of US military units and whip
up Arab support for his cause. In 1999, there were over 600 reported violations
of the no-fly zones by Iraqi military forces.®’ Saddam has invoked military
reactions from the US on numerous occasions in the past decade, including
major confrontations during January 1993, Operation Desert Strike in September
1996, Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, and countless tit-for-tat strikes
since 1999.®^
The high cost of military sanctions and Iraq's recalcitrant behavior in
complying with UN Resolutions has caused many US government leaders to ask
if the money spent containing Iraq has been worth the effort. The Chairman of
the US House Committee for International Relations stated in 2000;
Since (Operation Desert Fox in 1998), Saddam has routinely challenged
our aircraft patrolling over the no-fly zones, and we have retaliated each
time with air strikes. Again, we are told this policy is a success because it
is degrading Saddam's capabilities. Maybe we are degrading his
capabilities, but he does not seem to mind too much, because he keeps
provoking us to degrade him some more...®®
Another member of the House Committee may have summed it up best when he
drew a comparison between Saddam Hussein's life expectancy and that of his
colleague from South Carolina, Senator Strom Thurmond. “If Saddam had
anywhere near the same kind of life expectancy (98), you could be looking at
say. . .about $48 billion in direct cost to continue to maintain these military
sanctions. Do you think this approximately $50 billion expenditure is
worthwhile?”®^ The increasing frustration over the high cost of enforcing
sanctions and Iraq's continued defiance of UN Resolutions has prompted US
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policy-makers to look for a more permanent solution in Iraq. Hence, there is
increased discussion in the US news media in 2002 (especially after the
September 11^ terrorist attacks) about finally ousting Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq through military force, if necessary. The underlying message from
this discussion is that sanctions have failed to achieve US objectives in Iraq.

Loss of International Support for Sanctions
And finally, sanctioning Iraq has resulted in a loss of regional and
international support for US policy, thus making successful policy-making in the
region more difficult. The US finds itself increasingly isolated from even the
conservative countries in the Middle East over its sanctions policy in Iraq. For
example, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey have grown less
supportive of military strikes on Iraq in recent years. The Saudis have dictated
what types of missions can be flown from their air bases, and Turkey has also
occasionally refused the US permission to conduct strikes from its air bases.®®
Additionally, in Saudi Arabia both mainstream and radical dissident groups
have been protesting the large US military presence in the Kingdom. Saudis are
particularly upset about the cost of maintaining the US presence, arguing the
money could be better spent on services and infrastructure. Many Saudis in the
business community oppose the US presence because of the decline in
government hand-outs to the business sector, in order to pay for the US military
presence.®® The US military presence has also fueled the fire of Muslim extremist
groups such as AI Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden. One of the key principles of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

Al Qaeda is to unite all Muslims, to overthrow all Muslim governments which are
viewed as corrupt, to drive Western influence from those countries, and
eventually to abolish state boundaries. They advocate the use of force to
confront all foreign forces stationed on Islamic land.®^ Removal of the US
presence in Saudi Arabia is clearly a number one priority for these Muslim
extremist groups. In addition to the trouble caused by a large US military
presence, other nations are also concerned with the US objective of toppling
Saddam’s regime. Saudi Arabia and others are concerned that any opposition
success might increase the Shi'a influence in Iraq and further destabilize the
region. (Saudi Arabia is primarily Sunni Muslim, as is Saddam’s government.)
In general, the policy of retaining economic and military sanctions on Iraq
for the past decade has caused a large split among the UN Security Council
members. France, China and Russia have increasingly criticized the economic
sanctions and on-going bombings of Iraq. As permanent members of the
Security Council, they challenge the US and UK positions to retain sanctions.®®
Another open split between the UN Security Council members comes from
France and Russia, who have been openly trying to broker a deal between
Baghdad and the Kurdish parties in Iraq, something the US has not supported.
The US has tried to stay out of Kurdish internal affairs, and only supports the
Kurds through its policy of providing humanitarian assistance and protection
through the northern no-fly zone.®®
Proponents of sanctions toward Iraq have argued that Iraq has not
attacked its neighbors; therefore sanctions have been an effective policy tool.^®
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While this argument does satisfy the first of the four objectives mentioned above,
it does so at an enormous cost, and the other three objectives are left unfulfilled.
It is important to try to understand why this policy has not worked in Iraq, and
look at the global, domestic, and especially regional explanations for the policy's
failure. Now that sanctions have been described as a failed policy, it is important
to show that sanctions have been incompatible with the regional considerations
of the Middle East subsystem since the implementation of that policy.

Incompatibility with the Middle East Subsystem
Sanctions are an incompatible policy choice in the Middle East at all three
levels of analysis to some degree: globally, regionally, and domestically.
Globally, the diminishing international support of US policy toward Iraq since the
end of the Gulf War has politically hindered US ability to promote regional
stability and protect intrinsic interests (as discussed in Chapter 3). The US is
seen as an imperial enemy by the majority of Muslims, particularly Arab
nationalists and Islamic populists, due to its role in the Gulf War, sanctions, and
its support of Israel.'” The US has proven that it can protect its interests (such as
access to oil and the protection of Israel) through overwhelming military force.
However, it has become increasingly difficult for the US to keep a “coalition” of
states together to support its policies such as sanctioning Iraq.^^ Therefore, the
increased global difficulty for unilateral US actions has contributed to the failure
of sanctions in Iraq to a degree.
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By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it has become apparent that the only
reliable US partners in the Middle East are Britain and Israel. As mentioned
above, Russia, France and China have taken a softer stance toward Iraq when it
comes to sanctions. US policy decisions have diverged from even traditional
coalition partners such as Japan or Western Europe as well. There are very real
differences among Europe, Japan and the US in terms of national strategic
interests, diplomatic priorities, investment and trade interests, and domestic
political and economic interests. Japan and Europe have emphasized trade,
arms sales, and critical dialogue at a time when the US emphasizes strategic
stability, power projection, and counter-proliferation. Also, US ties to Israel are
much stronger than those of Japan and any European state.^® The US
emphasizes sanctions and "dual containment," and labels Iraq (and Iran) as
rogue states. Britain still supports US policy choices in the region, but the US
receives less support from other European countries (most notably France).
Japan does not usually differ from the US on policy towards Iraq publicly, but
privately has growing reservations that US policy towards Iraq lacks a realistic
resolution and may interfere with Japanese economic investment.^
The loss of global support for sanctions in Iraq is indicative of the loss of
support for US policies in the region in general. If US policy were more in
concert with the regional considerations of the Middle East, it seems more likely
that US policies would draw more support from the global community. However,
the sanctions policy against Iraq, for example, is a policy that is structurally
flawed at the regional and domestic level as well as the international level.
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Before we examine the regional-level problems with US sanctions policy, it is
important to review the incompatibility of the policy at the domestic level as well.
US support for Israel, combined with US domestic politics, makes it
difficult to come up with a better policy than sanctions against Iraq to achieve US
objectives. The US bias towards Israel (see Chapter 3) prevents a balanced
approach in the region. This is especially evident in the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio
where US domestic politics have precluded an even-handed approach to
negotiations between the Arabs and Israel.^® The strong inclination to reinforce
Israel at all costs remains the largest obstacle to a balanced foreign policy
approach in the Middle East. As a result of the current US political agenda,
which includes not only support for Israel but also a call for the containment of
rogue regimes, there has been little domestic pressure to lift sanctions against
Iraq. Instead, the demonizing of Saddam Hussein and Iraq (by US politicians
and media) has permitted the sanctions policy to be continued, despite the
numerous problems mentioned above that this policy has caused for the US at
the global and regional levels. Unfortunately, US policy-makers do not usually
analyze Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Arab-lsraeli problem systematically. It is
unclear whether the US population or policy-makers fully understand the
ramifications of sanctioning Iraq and wanting to support Israel at the same time.
This lack of regional analysis prevents the search for more viable solutions to US
policy concerns that would be more compatible with the regional considerations
of the Middle East.
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Besides the incompatibility of continued sanctions against Iraq at the
global and domestic levels, the policy is largely inconsistent with the regional
considerations outlined in Chapter 2. First, the non-democratic nature of the
region, especially Iraq, skews the effect sanctions will have on a country. Johan
Galtung concluded that sanctioning regimes that restrict all aspects of society
creates a more significant “rally-around-the-flag" effect than sanctioning
democratic societies.'*® Since Saddam Hussein controls the government and the
economy of Iraq, he has significant control over whether the average Iraqi citizen
will feel the effects of sanctions or not (and whom they will blame). In the Iraqi
case, the population is suffering under sanctions, yet Saddam controls the
country with an iron fist so that there can be no dissent as a result of sanctions.
Another way US sanctions policy is not compatible with the Middle East
regional subsystem comes from the economic structure of the region. The region
(and Iraq in particular) is much less developed than the West; therefore the
effects of sanctions will not be as harmful to the Iraqi economy as they would be
to a Western, industrialized country. The Iraqi economy at the beginning of
sanctions was not dependent on imports, which complicated the effects of
sanctions policy. There was sufficient domestic production to meet the minimum
needs of the population. Also, because of Iraq's experience during the Iran-lraq
War, Iraqi procurement procedures already included buying spare parts and
coping with patchwork repairs.'*^
A third way US sanctions policy is not compatible with the regional
considerations of the Middle East is the US' role in the Arab-lsraeli imbroglio.
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Israel’s actions against the Palestinians in the occupied territories are inexorably
linked to the US due to the tremendous amount of US aid provided to Israel. As
mentioned throughout this thesis, US support for Israel precludes any
widespread support of sanctions on Iraq by other Arab nations. As an example,
at the most recent Arab League Summit (March 2002), two important resolutions
were agreed upon. First, that there should be peace between the Arabs and
Israelis and that Israel should withdraw its forces back to the 1967 borders. A
second resolution proclaimed unanimous opposition (including Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia) to any further US-led attack on Iraq and "the lifting of the sanctions on
Iraq, ending the punishment of the Iraqi people."^® The resolutions indicate a
softer approach taken toward Iraq, which is perceived to be much less a threat to
the Arab states now than the escalation of violence between the Palestinians and
the Israelis. At the Organization of the Islamic Conference (QIC) summit in
Malaysia (April 2002), the Muslim nations declared they would maintain a “united
front" upholding the struggles of people under colonial domination for national
liberation. The QIC also declared; “We reject any unilateral action taken against
any Islamic country under the pretext of combating international terrorism, as this
will undermine global cooperation against terrorism."^® These summit resolutions
show growing solidarity of Arab and Muslim nations against unilateral US policy
decisions.
A fourth area that shows US sanctions policy incompatibility with the
Middle East subsystem is that it runs contrary to the pan-Arab ideals that are
espoused in the region. As mentioned above, the most recent Arab League
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summit resolutions underscore the idea that pan-Arab ideals are making a
comeback in the 2000s. Saudi Arabia’s peace proposal for the Arab-lsraeli
imbroglio was the first-ever Arab peace initiative offered to resolve the conflict.
Although too early to tell, this peace initiative could be indicative of a new
movement among the Arab population in the Middle East to reenergize pan-Arab
goals. Either way, the pan-Arabism that has defined the Middle East subsystem
is not compatible with the US policy of “punishing” Iraq through economic and
military sanctions.
If pan-Arabism continues to rise and the subsystem becomes more
focused, the US may find it increasingly difficult to enact policy decisions and
protect its strategic interests in the region. The potential for reversing the rising
trend of unity among Arabs and Muslims exists, but lately it has become more
difficult. Pan-Arabism feeds off the issues of Islamism. Therefore pan-Arabism
is more likely to follow the rise and fall of Islamic fundamentalism. The US war
on terrorism has angered many radical fundamentalists in the Middle East, who
see this war as being waged against Islam in general (refer to the poll data in
Chapter 2 that showed a majority of Muslims condemn the US attack on
Afghanistan). The renewed violence between Palestinians and Israelis has also
served to bring this focal issue back to the minds of the Arab and Muslim
population. Unfortunately, many Arabs believe the US has provided preferential
treatment to Israel for decades. Thus it will take a major shift in US policy to
prove the US can make a balanced approach in the region.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

Finally, in addition to the potential rise in pan-Arabism, the rise in antiAmericanism throughout the region highlights the incompatibility between
sanctioning Iraq and regional considerations of the Middle East. The anti-US
nature of the subsystem implies that most Middle Eastern nations will be
reluctant to support US policies in general. And specifically, the harmful effect of
sanctions on Iraq's population has increased that reluctance to support US
policies. Many in the region and abroad assume that the West (especially the
US) utilizes military force and sanctions for mostly economic motives and has no
real concern for the general population in the Middle East. This assumption
translates into a political cost of an increasingly negative public image among the
Arab nationalist and populist communities. This public image is what lays the
foundation for a secure future in which the US will be able to protect its own
interests while helping to maintain regional security.®® The anti-Americanism that
is prevalent in the Middle East subsystem, and the harmful effects of sanctions
on the Iraqi population make sanctions an incompatible policy choice for the US
to use in this region.

Conclusion
This chapter has shown that sanctions in Iraq have failed to achieve the
objectives they were designed to achieve (or kept in place to achieve). Saddam
Hussein continues his WMD program, is not in compliance with UN Resolutions,
and remains firmly in control of the country. Sanctions have not only been
unable to achieve US objectives in Iraq, but there have been some serious costs
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partially attributable to this policy. Increasing humanitarian concerns in Iraq, the
heavy toll on the US military, and the loss of international support for US policies
in the region may all be related in part to sanctions in Iraq.
This assessment has shown that sanctions are incompatible with the
regional considerations of the Middle East subsystem. Examining US sanctions
toward Iraq in terms of the regional considerations showed how the policy was
incompatible with five out of the six generalizations about the region. It is not
surprising then that sanctions in Iraq have not been able to achieve US
objectives for the past 11 years. Due to the nature of the region, sanctioning Iraq
may not have been the best policy solution for the US in light of the failure to
reach its objectives in this case. This appears to be the view of many within the
US government and the general population as there is a renewed call to topple
Saddam Hussein since the September 11th terrorist attacks. President Bush
said in April 2002, "...the policy of my government is to remove Saddam and...all
options are on the table.”®’ US public opinion polls have also found that over 75%
of those polled favor having US forces take military action against Iraq to force
Saddam Hussein from power.®^ This recent impetus to permanently “solve" the
Saddam Hussein problem demonstrates the failure of US sanctions policy. The
policy was incompatible with the regional considerations of the Middle East, and
thus was doomed to fail from the beginning.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has established that the Middle East comprises a regional
subsystem and, as such, actions that occur in one part of the region will affect
the rest of the region. The subsystem is also characterized by a number of
unique regional considerations that generally describe the behavior of countries
in the Middle East. By analyzing these considerations, one can examine US
policy in the region and begin to measure the policy's success based on those
considerations. A policy designed to complement the pan-Arabism or nondemocratic manner of the region, for example, is a policy that has a greater
chance of success. A policy that opposes these considerations is more likely to
fail.
Policy-makers tend to overlook the fact that the region must be analyzed
as a whole when anticipating responses to US policies. For example, any policy
designed to mitigate the fighting between Palestinians and Israelis must take into
account the reactions throughout the Middle East. Due to the nature of the
region, and the US' prominent role in the region, policies with one country will
have spillover effects into other countries. The way the US designs a
Palestinian-lsraeli policy is affected by its previous and future policies made
toward Iraq, Iran, or Saudi Arabia for example. Once the Middle East is
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interpreted as a system, it is easier to understand why some policies are more
likely to fail than others.
Analyzing the Middle East in a systemic manner is not only important to
ensure successful policy outcomes, but because the failure of US policy
damages future credibility. There has been a strong tendency in the US to make
foreign policy decisions based on public opinion, strong lobbying tactics, or
ideological reasons, without looking at the wider issues in the Middle East.
These domestic constraints on US policy-makers have resulted in policies that
appear to be inconsistent to many both regionally and globally. This type of adhoc policy-making without a long-term plan and solid regional analysis has
damaged the credibility of the US in the region.^
From a US foreign policy perspective, there are two major issues in 2002
facing the US in the Middle East: the increased violence between Israel and the
Palestinians, and what to do with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Based on
systemic analysis of the region as outlined in this thesis, the Arab-lsraeli issue
should be a top priority for the US. This conflict tends to polarize the region,
invigorate the radical regimes and Islamic extremists, and could become the
dominant issue for Arabs in the Middle East. The US must be careful in its
policy-making pertinent to this conflict because of the anti-US and pan-Arab/panIslamic nature of the region, coupled with the perception of a bias toward Israel
and historically inconsistent policy-making. A balanced approach in bringing an
end to the violence between the Arabs and Israelis would be the first step in
finding a policy solution compatible with the Middle East subsystem. However,
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based on the current perception of the US as the defender of Israel over the
Palestinians, and given the state of US domestic politics, a balanced approach is
not very likely in the near future.
The other major issue facing US politicians in the short term is how to get
rid of Saddam Hussein. The impetus behind finally ousting Saddam, according
to US policy-makers, is that Saddam still poses a risk to the region (and
potentially the world) with his weapons of mass destruction. He has also loosely
been linked to supporting terrorist organizations, and the US has vowed to wipe
out terrorism and those who support terrorists. The most popular policy solution
to eliminate the perceived threat Saddam poses is to topple his regime in Iraq.
This policy has a number of regional systemic problems. First, there is virtually
no support from the conservative Arab states to oust Saddam. An attack on Iraq
would likely strain relations between the US and its conservative Arab partners to
the breaking point. Second, it would fuel the anti-Americanism that is on the rise
throughout the general population of the Middle East and possibly provide a
focusing event to rally the Arab population. Third, it could threaten the stability of
oil exports and prices, as well as threaten regional stability depending on the
nature of a new Iraqi government. Additionally, there is virtually no international
support for ousting Saddam, with the exception of Great Britain. As discussed
earlier in Chapter 3, it has become exceedingly difficult for the US to act
unilaterally in the post-Gold War environment, making an attack on Iraq a very
difficult policy to uphold.
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The Middle East in 2002 is faced with multiple problems that threaten US
interests in the region: the alienation of the ruling elites from population, the
resurgence of Islamic movements, and increased violence between the Arabs
and Israel. US policy-makers need to understand all of these issues from a
systemic and regional perspective and make choices that are compatible with the
regional considerations of the Middle East. US policy support for Israel
especially needs to be reevaluated in terms of whether it is a “national interest” or
a “special interest.” The widespread negative effect this one policy has on many
US policies throughout the Arab world underscores the importance of taking a
closer look at the emphasis the US has placed on supporting Israel. US policy
makers need to understand that whether the policy is sanctioning Iraq, stationing
troops in Saudi Arabia, providing aid to Israel, or ferreting out terrorists in Yemen,
every policy action by the US is absorbed and reacted to by the Middle East as a
subsystem. What is needed is a sophisticated, systemic analysis of the Middle
East by US policy-makers to ensure US policies are successful.

Systems Theory as an Analytical Tool
Finally, it is important to examine how valuable the systemic approach has
been as a policy analysis tool. The application of systems theory has been
somewhat out of vogue since the 1970s in the field of international relations.
Tareq Ismael’s 1986 book. International Relations of the Contemoorarv Middle
East, used the systems approach to describe the Middle East and current issues
in the region. However, systems theory was not used as a tool to analyze

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124

particular foreign policies in Ismael’s book. As a tool for examining the issues of
a particular region, and the policies made internal and external to that region, the
systems approach has its merits. It allows one to use cultural, historical,
economic, and ideological as well as political attributes in combination when
describing the region. This is a broader, more complete approach than many
traditional theoretical international relations approaches that focus on one aspect
at a time such as economics or national security.
However, the systems approach does have some weaknesses. Most
significantly, its ability to encompass so many attributes of a region is a
hindrance as well as an advantage. Although a more thorough approach than
concentrating on one variable, there is virtually an infinite amount of inputs and
outputs to a system, making it impossible to account for all of the variables. The
six regional considerations used in this thesis were selected because they
appear to be the most salient features of the Middle East regional subsystem.
They also have the most significant affect on US policy-making. However, there
may be other regional characteristics that also describe the Middle East
accurately.
Despite Kaplan’s use of the word “rules” in his models of international
systems, there can never truly be any rules about how a system operates
(Kaplan does concede however that his rules merely specify “characteristic
behaviors” of systems).^ The variables of a system are too numerous to account
for everything that affects a system of states. Additionally, every state in a
system will not always act in accordance with the characteristics of that system.
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Therefore the systems approach is only useful in making broad generalities
about a regional or global system.
The approach taken in this thesis has been an attempt to use theoretical
aspects of the systems approach and operationalize the concepts to make a
useful tool. In this respect, systems theory provided the framework to analyze
current US policy toward the Middle East and its failure in the case of Iraqi
sanctions. As Harold Saunders wrote, “...familiar concepts of international
relations do not always explain what we see in an area such as the Middle East,
and familiar instruments of statecraft do not reliably produce the results we
expect of them.”^ Because of this, using a somewhat unique approach to conduct
policy analysis (systems theory) has provided a unique perspective on US
policies in the Middle East. This perspective could be useful to policy-makers
and aid them in formulating sound policies compatible with the region. This in
turn would increase the chance of policy success and the attainment of US goals
in the Middle East.
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Conclusion Notes
^Tareq Y. Ismael, Intemational Relations and the Contemporary Middle
East: A Study in World Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986),
161.
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Intemational Politics (New
York: Wiley, 1957), 9.
^Harold H. Saunders, “A Broader Peace Process for the Middle East," in
The Middie East in Global Perspective, eds. Judith Kipper and Harold H.
Saunders (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 301.
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